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ABSTRACT
The debate on the increasing adoption of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)
in modern agriculture has been in vogue for the last twenty years. Whereas the
European Union (EU) has always maintained an antagonistic attitude towards the use
of biotechnology in feed and food production, most North and South American countries
have largely embraced the use genetically engineered crops. In this regard, the differences
between the EU and North/South America in terms of GMO legislations are supposedly
due to the role of risk analysis: since the EU legislative process is firmly based on the
so-called ”Precautionary Principle”, the approval of biotech crops for food and feed use
has been typically sluggish, with a rather slow introduction of new varieties. These
legislative discrepancies, along with the resulting difference in the rate of adoption of GM
crops, pose two fundamental problems to the trade of agricultural products: on the one
hand, the decreasing availability of non-GM raw materials rises the discussion of how the
supply chains for such products cope with the higher probability of low level presence1;
on the other hand, the trade of conventional products is also undermined by the possible
occurrence of unauthorized GM events in overseas batches indented for export to the EU.
In addition, the wide adoption of GM crops in North and Latin America poses the question
of what effect, if any, the spreading of biotechnology in agriculture has exerted on real
market prices. In this thesis, we try to answer these three research questions using maize
and soybean as reference markets. First of all, we set up a case study for investigating
how the Italian supply chain of non-GM soybean meal is framed and managed in order to
reduce the risk of low level presence. Based on vis-a´-vis interviews and transaction costs
1When used in relation to GM material, the term refers to the incidental presence of GM material in
food, feed or grain at levels that are consistent with generally accepted agricultural and manufacturing
practices.
economics, we conclude that hybrid organizations represent the best governance form.
Next, we estimate the EU import demand for maize and soybean in order to assess the
role of legislative diversities (in the matter of GMOs) on EU import decisions. Estimated
cross-price elasticities suggest that dissimilarities in approval statuses between the EU and
its major exporters do not influence imports. Therefore, we conclude that competition
among exporters is based on price and seasonality. Last, a structural vector autoregression
(SVAR) is set up to disentangle the role of GMOs adoption on the variability of US
soybean market prices from 2000 to 2014. Results indicate that the introduction of
biotech soybean reduces real soybean market prices in the short run, yet the effect is
short lived and not much relevant.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The debate about the swift spreading of biotechnology in modern agriculture, particularly
when it comes to the adoption of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), has begun since
the introduction of the first genetically engineered crops in the United States (US) during
the nineties. After more than twenty years, however, the controversy has not diminished
at all, at least in the European Union (EU). This is evidenced by two recent events that,
in fact, reinforce the European position in relation to the use of GMOs in agriculture.
The first one consists in the amendment of Directive 18/2001 concerning the release into
the environment of GMOs, while the other coincides with the adoption of ”GM-free”
voluntary labelling schemes by an increasing number of member states (MS). Although
both measures have in practice no immediate or dramatic market implications, they prove
that the old continent has strengthened its stance against the use of genetic engineering
in agriculture. The approval of Directive 412/20151 provides a quite new prospective to
the cultivation of GM crops in the EU: whereas Directive 18/2001 allowed MS to forbid
the cultivation of GM varieties deemed to be hazardous on the basis of new scientific
evidence, with Directive 412/2015 MS can impose bans on GM crops under far weaker
conditions. At the same time, France, Austria, Germany and The Netherlands have
established framework laws allowing food retailers and manufacturers to introduce the
so-called ”negative labelling” for goods produced without the use of GMOs. In particular,
these rules specify, on the one hand, the words that may be used to identify a product as
”GMO-free” and, on the other hand, the thresholds for the accidental presence of GM raw
material; thresholds are typically very low (from 0.5% to 0.1%) and, in general, positive
limits are issued because of the impossibility to achieve 0% accidental presence.
1which amends Directive 18/2001 in article 26.
The reason for the current European anti-GM position is most likely the consequence of
at least three cultural, scientific and political factors: first of all, the negative attitude of
European consumers towards GMOs has almost surely limited farmers’ incentives to adopt
biotechnologies and, in general, it has addressed European policy makers accordingly;
second, the uncertainty surrounding environmental and food safety issues have inspired
a legislative process firmly based on the so-called ”Precautionary Principle2”; third, the
resistance of many MS to introduce major innovations in their agricultural systems may
have significantly influenced European policy decisions in the last fifteen years.
Eurobarometer 2010 (European Commission, 2010) points out that, although European
consumers are quite familiar with the concept GM food3, only 27% of the respondents
is supporting the adoption of GMOs. Globally, the European public sees GM food as
unsafe, inadequate and worrying. Some authors believe that the reported absence of
benefits originates from the lack of tangible consumers’ benefits from the so called ”first
generation” of GM crops; indeed, this technological innovation gave birth to biotech
agricultural products with characteristic mostly fitting farmers’ needs. In addition, the
country-level analysis on consumers’ willingness to adopt GM crops clearly shows that
in most MS the acceptance of GM crops has declined over time; in particular, results for
Italy indicate that the share of consumers willing to encourage GM cultivation dropped
from 51% in 1996 to 24% in 2010. This data reflect a trend common to all European
countries with a GM crops’ ban in place. In contrast, MS where GM crops are widely
grown (i.e. Spain and Portugal) typically show highest levels of acceptance, which might
suggest a link between private attitudes and public policies.
The discussion about the potential threats of genetic engineering to the environment
and public health has reached no consensus yet. Based on the principle of substantial
equivalence between GM varieties and conventional ones (Kuiper et al., 2001), most
of the scientific community has already established the absence of food safety issues
for genetically engineered crops (Snell et al. (2012), Hollingworth et al. (2003), Key
2See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Al32042 for details.
3EU survey shows that nearly half of the interviewed have heard about GMOs and searched for
information as well. Only about 18% have not heard of it before the interviews.
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et al. (2008) and European Commission (2015a))4; nevertheless, there seem to be still
plenty of opponents in the public opinion. According to Herring (2008), the reluctance
to accept the introduction of rDNA (recombinant DNA) technology in agriculture is
mostly rooted in the asymmetries which characterize the complex network of interests
and ideas surrounding genetic engineering. Whereas the debate about health concerns
from the consumption of GMOs is largely outside the scope of this thesis5, the issues
arising from the introduction of biotech crops into the environment has fostered economic
research concerning the sustainability of the so-called ”coexistence6 systems”. The
establishment of a coexistence strategies stems from the well known ”Precautionary
Principle” by which of all European policies regarding products potentially dangerous
to humans, animals and environment should be draft on the basis of a comprehensive
risk assessment analysis. Regulation 1829/2003 and 1830/2003 complement the legal
framework about the marketing of GM food and feed products inside the EU; in particular,
the two Regulation establish that only authorized products can be placed on the market
and, if a food or feed product contains more than 0.9% of GM material, it must be
labelled as ”containing genetically modified organisms”. Since the 2003 legislation de
facto prohibited the presence of unauthorized GM varieties in food and feed products
commercialized in the EU, this posed serious import problems to agricultural commodities
originated from overseas countries like Argentina, Brazil and the US. If fact, both North
4There are however some ”independent” works which recommend some caution when drawing
conclusion from empirical methodologies: for example, Taleb et al. (2014) invoke the application of
the Precautionary Principle, in light of systemic risk that might be associated to the cultivation and
consumption of genetically engineered crops.
5Of course, this aspect is not secondary and is still particularly delicate; for example, the recent
article by Se´ralini et al. (2012) received a lot of media attention before (and after) being retracted by
the editor.
6The European Commission provides the following definition of coexistence: ”Coexistence refers
to the choice of consumers and farmers between conventional, organic and GM crop production, in
compliance with the legal obligations for labelling defined in Community legislation. The possibility of
adventitious presence of GM crops in non-GM crops cannot be excluded. Therefore, suitable measures
are needed during cultivation, harvest, transport, storage and processing to ensure coexistence.”
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and South America have largely embraced the ”GM side” and have rapidly adopted
biotech maize and soybean varieties which are still pending for authorization in the
European Union. Recognizing that trading commodities involves several steps which
typically involve commingling and accidental admixtures, the EU realized that achieving
0% of unauthorized varieties in import batches was technically impossible. Therefore,
Regulation 619/2011 sanctioned a 0.1% threshold as technical zero level for detected
presence. Nevertheless, this tiny threshold still poses non trivial trade issues when it comes
to agricultural commodities such as maize and soybean (Henseler et al. (2013), de Faria
and Wieck (2015), Kalaitzandonakes (2011)). In fact, not only the major international
Fig. 1.1: World major maize and soybean exporter (2014, data in million of metric tons, MMT).
Source: UN Trade Statistics (2015).
maize and soybean exporters coincide with the world largest growers of GM varieties (see
figure 1.1 and 1.2); but also the most relevant exporters of maize and soybean to the EU
match with the countries presented in figure 1.2.
The specific mention to maize and soybean is not casual: as shown in figure 1.3, these
two products represent the most imported agricultural commodities within the European
Union and, in general, they are among the most traded dry bulks on the international
market. In particular, the European trade balance for soybeans and soybean meal is
largely in deficit (UN Trade Statistics, 2015), meaning that the low self-sufficiency exposes
6
Fig. 1.2: Rate of adoption (land cultivated with GM varieties/total arable land) of GM maize
and soybean in Argentina, Brazil and the US (2012).
Source: James (2012), USDA, NASS (2015).
the EU to potential exogenous market shocks. In this regard, the predominance of the
EU soybean imports over exports is due to at least three factors: first, the abolishment of
import duties on oilseed crops (Dillon Round, 1962) and the contemporaneous ban of meat
and bone meals in early 2000 has forced EU livestock breeders to switch to high-protein
crops; second, the European predominance of continental weather has hindered the
cultivation of soybean thereby fostering imports; third, the EU Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) reforms has strongly influenced farmers’ decisions and addressed cropping
choices towards other products (Bertheau and Davison, 2011).
There is no need to remark that the discrepancy between Europe and America regarding
the adoption of GM crops poses the additional question of understanding what is the
cost to European farmers and livestock breeders of being foreclosed to this particular
product innovation. The literature on the matter is rather extensive and covers both
the evaluation of welfare effects (for farmers and consumers) from adopting biotech crops
(Lapan and Moschini (2004), Sobolevsky et al. (2005), Moschini et al. (2005)) and the
direct impact of cultivating GM varieties on farmers’ production costs (Fernandez-Cornejo
et al. (2000), Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (2002), Bullock and Nitsi (2001)); in this respect,
7
Fig. 1.3: Most imported agricultural commodities in the European Union (2014, data in million
of metric tons, MMT).
Source: UN Trade Statistics (2015).
however, results obtained through partial equilibrium and regression analysis are mixed.
In addition, meta analysis indicate that significant differences in yields and profits are
found when comparing herbicide tolerant with insect resistant GM crops and economic
benefits, if any, are strictly dependent on geographical areas, marketing year and the GM
trait adopted (Klu¨mper and Qaim, 2014; Finger et al., 2011). Since the US represent
the most important soybean exporter to the EU (Eurostat, 2015), understanding what
effect the extensive adoption of biotech soybean has possibly exerted on US soybean real
market prices is particularly relevant for the competitiveness of EU livestock breeders.
Since GM crops have been cultivated in the US for nearly twenty years, there is now
enough historical evidence to investigate this relationship empirically.
1.1 Research questions
Based on the arguments discussed so far, this thesis aims at addressing the following
research questions:
1. Considering
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(a) the scarce acceptance of GM products by European consumers;
(b) the introduction of a new stream of legislation supporting ”GM-free” labels
we investigate how non-GM supply chains are structured in order to cope with the
risk of cross contamination between the GM and non-GM batches.
2. In light of
(a) the importance of soybean and maize as raw materials in the European feed
industry;
(b) the huge adoption of GM varieties in the major exporting countries;
(c) the tiny threshold allowed for EU-unauthorized GM events
we estimate the European demand for maize and soybean under the assumption
of geographically differentiated products. We expect, among others, that import
decision might be significantly affected by differences in rate of adoption of GM
crops.
3. Given the extensive adoption of GM soybean in the US since the early 2000s, we
examine which role (if any) the spreading of herbicide resistant varieties has exerted
on real soybean market price.
1.2 Methods
The following thesis is structured in three different self-standing chapters. Each chapter
is linked to the other through the common ground of GM and non-GM maize and soybean
international trade. In each chapter, one of the three research questions is specifically
addressed using an appropriate empirical strategy; in this regard, our work will involve the
use of both qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques. These methods are briefly
introduced in the following paragraphs.
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1.2.1 Chapter 2
In this chapter, we define the structure and assess the operation of the Italian supply
chain for non-GM soybean meal. In particular, we develop a case study based on
vis-a´-vis interviews with industry representatives which provided the main input for
the following economic analysis. Questionnaires were build to investigate the upstream
and the downstream part of the supply chain separately: downstream respondents were
representatives from the feed, retail, soybean crushing and livestock breeding industries,
while those involved in upstream operations were primarily large international trading
companies and port operators. We chose to frame and study these primary source
information using the theory of hybrid organizations proposed by Williamson (1991)
and Me´nard (2004) within the broader field of Transaction Costs Economics (TCE).
This stream of literature provides a useful conceptual framework for understanding how
players in the supply chain behave when quality and market uncertainty are high enough
to hinder the exploitation of vertical integration. Given the absence of reliable secondary
data (i.e. time series observations) regarding the price and the trade volume of non-GM
agricultural products, case studies represent perhaps the only instrument available to
investigate scientifically the issues related to the marketing of non-GM products.
1.2.2 Chapter 3
In the second part of this thesis, we estimate the EU demand for maize and soybean
grains in order to trace out any possible substitution and/or complementary relationship
among different exporters. Under the well-known Armington’s hypothesis (Armington,
1969), we consider products originating from different overseas countries as imperfect
substitutes based on source-specific product characteristics such as nutritional value,
product flow management and asynchronous approval of GM crop varieties. Demand
analysis is carried out using the differential approach to demand theory proposed by
Washington and Kilmer (2002b) and initially developed by Laitinen and Theil (1978).
In particular, the EU derived demand for maize and soybeans is modelled through
a Differential Factor Allocation Model (DFAM) which is derived from a general cost
10
minimization problem. The production theory approach to international trade is preferred
to traditional methodologies which consider imports as final goods entering the consumers’
utility functions directly. This has at least three advantages: first, it is conceptually
appropriate to the problem; second, it does not need the specification of a flexible
functional form; third, it does not need aggregation across heterogeneous consumers.
Moreover, since our data consists of quarterly times series for the past fifteen years,
modelling demand in log-differences provides a useful way to wipe out non-stationarity
in the data. Last, the model is flexible enough to include (temporal) fixed effects, and
conditional Hicksian elasticities are very easy to compute.
1.2.3 Chapter 4
The last chapter of the thesis addresses the effect of GMOs adoption in the US on real
soybean market prices using quarterly times series from year 2000 to 2014. We disentangle
this relationship using a 5-dimensional structural vector autoregression (SVAR) where
real soybean prices, energy prices, speculation activity on the soybean futures market,
global demand of dry bulks and the rate of adoption7 of biotech soybean in the US are
simultaneously regressed on all endogenous variables and their lags. In particular, we use
impulse response analysis to understand, among others, how market prices respond to a
standard deviation shock in the share of GM soybean cultivated in the US. In addition,
we perform forecast error variance decomposition to measure how much of the variability
in soybean market prices is attributable to the rate of adoption of GM soybean within
one or more quarters.
7This is measured as the ratio between the arable land cultivated with biotech soybean and the global
area dedicated to soybean planting.
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2. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SEGREGATION BETWEEN
GM AND NON-GM CROPS IN ITALY
Paper by Varacca Alessandro, Boccaletti Stefano and Claudio Soregaroli, published in Agbioforum,
Volume 17(2). 2014.
2.1 Background: the Italian market for non-GM products
The worldwide area dedicated to GM crops has been steadily increasing over the last
20 years and to date more than 150 million hectares are devoted to these varieties
(Kalaitzandonakes, 2011). In countries where these technologies are available, the rate
of adoption is generally high. According to the USDA, the United States, with 69.5
million hectares of GM crops planted in 2012, are the largest producer in the world.
Brazil ranks second, with nearly 36.6 million hectares of GM maize, soybean and cotton
in marketing year (hereafter MY) 2012/2013. The adoption rate of GM soybean reached
85% in MY 2011/2012 (21 million hectares), whereas the share of GM cotton was about
32% (490,000 hectares) and that of GM maize 67% (almost 10 million hectares). By July
2012, Brazil had 34 genetically engineered crops approved: 19 maize varieties, 9 cotton
and 5 soybeans. Argentina, with 23.6 million hectares in 2011/2012, provides almost
15% of the total world production and is the third largest producer (Foreign Agricultural
Service, 2012a). Although these data provide a clear picture of the adoption of GM crops
around the world, more difficult is to assess the size of the non-GM production. This value
is not simply the difference between the total production and the GM one, as a non-GM
crop is defined according to specific labels requiring thresholds for GM admixture and
certifications of compliance. Production data of Identity Preserved (IP) non-GM crops are
even more difficult to derive: non-GM IP crops require stricter controls along the supply
chain, third party certification and a stronger commitment of all the parties involved.
Therefore, most estimates rely on trade data, although they mostly provide upper limits
rather than ranges (Kalaitzandonakes, 2011). The demand for non-GM crops has three
main destination markets (EU, South Korea and Japan) and remained stable over the
last ten years. According to the European feed industry association (FEFAC), almost
15% of the EU compound feed production is certified non-GM. Poultry is the sector with
the strongest demand for non-GM feed, as a significant part of poultry meat is sold under
some sort of quality labels (i.e. organic) requiring non-GM feeding. Moreover, soybean
meal for its characteristics is hardly replaceable in poultry, piglets and calves feeding,
while cattle and mature animals can find more substitutes (Bertheau and Davison, 2011).
The EU is almost self-sufficient for maize; only 10% of the internal consumption relies on
imports, nearly 6.2 million of metric tons (MMt), 75% of which are non-GM, originating
mainly from Ukraine and Brazil (Foreign Agricultural Service, 2012b). Instead, the EU
is a net importer of soybeans and soybean meal, with non-GM varieties imported mainly
from Brazil. Although the rate of adoption of GM maize and soybean crops in Brazil
has been steadily increasing over the last few years, this country is still the largest world
exporter of non-GM soybean and maize products addressed mainly to EU-27, Japan and
South Korea. India and China are also large producers of non-GM soybean, but they
do not contribute to trade: China does not export soybeans, mainly because of the large
internal demand for protein feedstuff, while safety issues hinder India from exporting
soybean meal (Tillie et al., 2012). Overall, the EU produces limited amounts of soybean
and needs to import more than 30 MMt yearly of soybean and soybean meal to feed
animals. Although Italy is the largest EU producer of soybeans (350,000 tons/year),
the country is still a large net importer with imports that constitute over 90% of the
total available soybean meal. Italian imports of soybean meal were up to 2.15 MMt
in 2010, 7.5% of which non-GM hard IP1. Considering that the domestic production is
1In general, Hard-IP requires strict thresholds and segregation practices as well as tests performed
by accredited laboratories all along feed/food supply chains. Definitions distinguish between Hard and
Soft-IP. Some sources refer to Hard-IP product management systems as arrangements implying accurate
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100% non-GM, total non-GM availability can be approximated at 13.8% of the total
available soybean meal on the domestic market. Imports of non-GM soybeans in grains
are generally zero; only in years of scarce domestic harvests imports may turn positive and
significant. Italy imports non-GM soybean meal mostly from Brazil. Concerning maize,
the Country is much more self-sufficient with imports that weight less than 20% of the
total available maize on the domestic market. Roughly 95% of the imported maize (1.9
MMt in 2010) comes from other European countries where GM varieties are not allowed,
with the largest share coming from Germany and France. Only 5% of imported maize
is from Ukraine and Latin America and it is not clear whether this product is non-GM.
The Italian market for non-GM feed is relatively small and both manufacturers and their
customers are specialized enterprises in a specific supply chain, with livestock breeders
being at most small-medium enterprises. That is, the competitive advantage for producers
does not necessarily depend on the exploitation of economies of scale (Boccaletti et al.,
2012), but rather on the slim and flexible structure and the capacity to respond promptly
in terms of volumes sold, delivery schedules and just-in-time production to temporary
supply shortages (Boccaletti et al., 2012). Moreover, unit costs are minimized at full
capacity, a condition harder to achieve in large non-GM specialized facilities.
Since the availability of non-GM soybean is typically more problematic than the
availability of non-GM maize, the rest of our discussion will focus on the economic aspects
of segregation between GM and non-GM soybean in Italy.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 The survey
We investigated the structure of the Italian supply chain for maize and soybean through
a number of vis-a´-vis interviews with representatives from relevant enterprises. Each
interview lasted between 2 and 3 hours; case by case, questions were organized in a
traceability; others define the difference between Hard and Soft-IP in terms of certification and auditing
procedures. (Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique INRA, 2009)
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framework developed on the basis of a comprehensive review of the available literature
regarding the structure, the organization and the governance of the supply chain (for
GM and non-GM crops) (Boccaletti et al., 2012). This framework consisted of two
structured questionnaires, addressed to investigate the upstream and the downstream
part of the supply chain respectively. The full questionnaires are available in appendix
A. Downstream respondents were from the feed, retail, soybean crushing and livestock
breeding industries, those involved in upstream operations were primarily from large
international trading companies and port operators. The questionnaire for the upstream
operations has been more difficult to build and validate. Following the lack of information
regarding how international trading companies organize their transactions and manage
product and information flows, we faced a certain degree of uncertainty in drafting the
framework. For example, we have not been able to pre-test it, and therefore we made
progressive adjustments as the interviews proceeded. The questionnaire is structured
into four sections. The first section identifies how the product and information flows
are shaped, with emphasis on contractual arrangements and liabilities; the two following
sections investigate the operations and responsibilities at the port level; whereas the
final section refers to the physical transportation of the product from the origin to the
destination country. The second questionnaire was revised after pre-testing with market
experts from associations of producers, therefore with deep knowledge of the feed industry
and its major trends. It is structured into six sections. The first section refers to the
vertical and horizontal structures of the supply chain and asks also some preliminary
details on market concentration and vertical integration. The second section considers
the market for primary processed maize and soybean as well as the market for compound
feed, listing questions on trade data and domestic production volumes. Sections three
and four focus on the governance aspects of the upstream supply chain, including terms
of trade among actors and pricing mechanisms. The last two sections are dedicated
to the marketing and management of non-GM segregated products and to the role of
certifiers. In this paper we decided to focus primarily on the upstream portion of the
supply chain (figure 2.1). Based upon the information obtained from representatives
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of international trading companies, our aim was to assess the transactions between
major overseas producers of non-GM soybean meal, international trading companies and
domestic producers of non-GM feed. The management of product and the information
flows from the field to the export terminal together with the following unloading and
storage phases in dedicated facilities at the destination port are the key steps for
segregation between GM and non-GM commodities (Pelaez et al., 2010; Bertheau, 2009).
Therefore, we focused on two main transactions: the first between Brazilian selling
companies (which aggregate non-GM soybeans and produce non-GM soybean meal)
and the main international trading companies; the second between international trading
companies and Italian feedstuff producers.
Fig. 2.1: The supply chain for soybean meal supplied to Italy.
Source: personal interviews, 2013
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2.2.2 Theoretical framework
Building upon Williamson (1979, 1981, 1987, 1991), Me´nard (2004, 2012), Me´nard
and Valceschini (2005), we arranged the information from the interviews using a
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach. The objective is to describe the nature of
vertical relationships through the analysis of the determinants of economic organizational
structures, namely asset specificity and different types of uncertainty. The core of the
theory refers to whether a transaction is performed more efficiently within a hierarchical
structure (i.e. within a firm) or by unrelated agents (i.e. market governance); the scope
of the analysis relies on the transfer of goods and services. How this transfer occurs is
the main outcome of interest. TCE also asserts that agents carrying out transactions
are rationally bounded, risk neutral and in some cases they behave opportunistically in
presence of asymmetric information. Although the neoclassical perspective of transactions
considers market governance as more efficient than vertical integration because of
the role played by competition and the reduced burden of bureaucracy, transaction
characteristics and the behavioural problems of economic agents may lead to market
failures. The specificity of the assets involved (transaction-specific assets), the frequency
of the transaction and the level of uncertainty (which is mainly related to the bounded
rationality and opportunistic behaviour of the agents involved) represent the three main
dimensions which may cause markets to fail. Markets fail because transaction costs
arise, making transactions through a simple market governance inefficient; these costs
refer to search for ex-ante information, ex-ante and ex-post monitoring costs. Market
failures suggest that, for some degree of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of
the transaction, hierarchical structures could perform better than markets. Williamson
defines three main economic organizations under which transactions can be established:
market, hybrid forms and hierarchy. Hybrid forms are organizations between the market
governance and hierarchical structures; according to the core of TCE, all hybrids share
some common characteristics. In particular, Me´nard (2004) emphasizes the following
three:
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• Resource pooling: whatever the hybrid form is, the agents involved converge in
organizing their activities through inter-firm cooperation and coordination, so that
investment decision relevant to the exchange are made jointly. The choice of the
partner becomes a central issue.
• Contracting: coordination relies mostly on contracts, which differ by nature.
• Competition: parties within an hybrid form often compete against each other and
also tend to compete with other arrangements. Formal mechanisms to discipline
partners, solving conflicts and avoiding free-riding become crucial.
Me´nard (2004, 2012) revisited the diversity of hybrid organizations proposed by
Williamson, providing the idea that the decision to adopt one form of hybrid organization
over another is linked to the logic of transaction costs (Re´viron and Chappuis, 2005).
Hybrid forms based on trust (which operates as a weak form of governance) are those
which are closest to the market governance; on the other hand, formal governance
includes hybrid forms sharing more characteristics with hierarchies than with market
governance. Relationships characterized by trust fit with a low degree of assets
specificity, while formal governance structures are associated with higher investments
in transaction-specific assets. Between these two forms of hybrid organizations we may
find relational networks and leadership: the former, differently from trust, presents formal
rules defining the relationship, the latter is a hybrid form coordinated by a leader with
a key position along the supply chain. Concerning the three dimensions which drive
transaction costs, the classical TCE view (Williamson, 1991) emphasizes the predominant
role of asset specificity in determining the properties of the economic organizations for
transactions. Asset specificity refers to the degree to which the assets employed within a
specific transaction can be redeployed for other uses without sacrificing productive value.
According to the theory, as asset specificity increases, the ability to redeploy the assets
gets lower and interdependency between parts increases, fuelling opportunistic behaviour
under market governance. In his review on the diversity of hybrid forms, Me´nard
(2004) supports the hypothesis that the most important property affecting the form of
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alignment between parties is the degree of specificity of the assets involved. A second
important dimension is uncertainty: this transaction costs determinant arises either
when the relevant contingencies surrounding a transaction are to a large or small extent
unpredictable to be formalized into an ex-ante contract, or when performances cannot
be easily predicted and verified ex-post. The issue of uncertainty on quality is central
to the supply chain for non-GM goods. Uncertainty in transactions where the quality
of the goods involved is relevant originates from a problem of information asymmetry
between agents; the lack of information affects primarily the buyer, unable to identify
”plums” from ”lemons”. According to Akerlof (1970), with information asymmetry
the weak side of a transaction (the buyer) faces a ”moral hazard” problem and faces
a higher risk of finding a bad partner. Additionally, information asymmetry protects bad
partners if they cannot be easily separated from the good ones (Re´viron and Chappuis,
2005). Some authors recognize several types of uncertainty: environmental uncertainty,
behavioural uncertainty, technological uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty related to product
quality) and volume uncertainty (Walker and Weber, 1984). Williamson (1991) also states
that the role played by uncertainty on the degree of vertical integration or coordination
depends on the degree of specificity of the assets. That is, increased uncertainty in
presence of a non-trivial degree of asset specificity suggests that continuity between
the transacting parties becomes important and adaptive capabilities are necessary, thus
rendering market governance less preferable than other organized structures (i.e. firms
or hybrids). Nonetheless, hybrid forms, in presence of transaction-specific assets, are
perceived as less valuable as the degree of uncertainty increases. In fact, an hybrid form
is bilateral in nature but mutual consent is hard to achieve with very high levels of
uncertainty. However, there are several studies addressing the role of uncertainty without
accounting for its interaction with asset specificity, or at least they do not focus on the
combined effect of uncertainty and assets specificity. These studies try to explain whether
uncertainty may cause either hierarchical or market oriented organizations independently
from the specificity of the assets involved (Joshi and Stump, 1999; David and Han, 2004;
Geyskens et al., 2006; Wei et al., 2012). In the case of segregated supply chains for
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non-GM goods, we expect uncertainty to play a key role in shaping the organizational
forms by virtue of the higher transaction costs generated by both market conditions
(price changes, total transaction volumes, characteristics of the demand) and agents’
behaviour (suppliers’ unpredictability, regulatory uncertainty) (David and Han, 2004).
Consistently with TCE (Me´nard, 2012), prior research (Jap, 1999; Klein et al., 1990)
supported the effectiveness of hybrid forms of governance in presence of a nontrivial (but
not very high) level of uncertainty; in fact, uncertainty makes both market governance
and hierarchies less effective and the adoption of hybrid organizational structures may
contribute to mitigating the problems of evaluation and monitoring caused by uncertain
environments (Joshi and Stump, 1999; Lee et al., 2009). This is particularly true when
it comes to uncertainty stemming from market turbulence and unpredictable demand
and supply conditions (Joshi and Stump, 1999; Lee et al., 2009; Wei et al., 2012).
Considering the uncertainty of quality under pure market conditions, the buyer bears
the risk of acquiring a sub-optimal product whenever a minimum quality standard is
required. Whereas different forms of signalling could help the buyer in a preliminary
selection of the suppliers, the goodwill between transactors must be guaranteed with a
specific organizational structure able to avoid opportunism and cheating (Reviron, 2000).
In this case, non-trivial level of uncertainty calls for a tighter control of the buyer over
the supplier. Transactions characterized by a very high level of uncertainty are less likely
to be organized in hybrid forms, since mutual consent is generally not feasible (Lee et al.,
2009). In fact, as uncertainty gets larger, hybrid organizations have to deal with some
coordination issues: this translates into a higher effort for accommodating adaptation
(in order to keep flexibility), control (in order to maintain the process unaffected) and
incentives (to prevent opportunistic behaviour). In this case, either unilateral forms
of governance (Wei et al., 2012) or market-oriented structures may solve the problem.
However, some authors (Joshi and Stump, 1999) assert that, being the organizational
structures dynamic, this sharp distinction is rather deceptive. In this work, we mainly
focus on the role played by the different types of uncertainty in shaping the organizational
structure of the transaction between Brazilian suppliers, international trading companies
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and Italian feedstuff producers.
2.3 Supply chains for Non-GM soybean meal
As to reduce quality-related uncertainty, Brazilian producers of non-GM soybean meal,
the international trading company and feed manufacturers developed an organizational
structure which relies on highly formalized contracts and provides for a traceability
and certification system covering all the steps along the supply chain, from Brazilian
growers to Italian port operators. The upstream part of the chain is built and validated
by large international certification bodies in partnership with Brazilian crushers and it
represents a necessary feature for the product to match the standards set by Italian feed
manufacturers. In one of our case study, the Brazilian crusher established contracts with
individual farmers and wholesalers implementing the segregation of non-GM soybeans.
The certifier approves the soybean meal as non-GM by certifying each stage of the supply
chain including: production and multiplication of seeds, grain production, industrial
processing and delivery for export.
• At the seed production and multiplication stage, the crusher inspects and approves
the entire process through a set of activities that ranges from the production of seeds
by specialized cooperatives to the distribution of the seeds to soybean growers. The
company is also in charge of monitoring the distribution of the seeds from the
cooperatives to multipliers, seed planting, seed harvest and storage in dedicated
silos (Pelaez et al., 2010).
• Grain production is also inspected and approved by the Brazilian crusher; at this
stage the task is not limited to monitoring and includes testing procedures for the
absence of GM events. Transportation of the harvested soybeans is a sensitive step
of the production system and implies systematic strip testing on chronologically
numerated batches. All the information is recorded and maintained for system
certification (Pelaez et al., 2010).
• Industrial processing involves samples collection, as soybeans are unloaded into the
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processing plant. Twice a week, composite samples are PCR-tested at an accredited
laboratory (Pelaez et al., 2010).
• The crushing company’s monitoring activity intensifies in the last stage, because
the risk of admixture of non-GM products with other loads at the port terminal
is very high. Certified procedures for export include: sampling when trucks are
loaded; machinery and personnel cleaning before truck unloading or ship loading
operations; daily physiochemical test on composite samples ; the issue of one
Transaction Certificate of Compliance for each shipload; once the product is loaded
on the ship, one further sample is taken for PCR analysis to certified laboratories:
results are disclosed while the vessel is still on its way to Europe. The Brazilian
crushing company forwards the certification papers to the trader, who requires such
documents (in addition to any other formal document the company might require)
when the payment is done (Pelaez et al., 2010).
On its part, the international trading company must deploy a system which guarantees
the compliance with the GM threshold required by Italian customers for the non-GM
product. The trader is responsible for ship’s hold cleaning and inspection before the
soybean meal is loaded and tested. Cooperation and coordination between the parts
involved in these activities is crucial for achieving a low level of presence of GM events
into the cargoes. Product management at the destination port is another critical step,
and the implementation of best management practices helps to avoid commingling and
adventitious presence. Therefore, it is important for international dealers to rely, on
the one hand, on process-certified terminals and, on the other hand, to coordinate the
activities of any actor involved in port operations, namely: grain terminals, shipping
agents, port supervisors and finals customers. In particular, grain terminals are bound
to employ dedicated cells, properly cleaned before non-GM soybean meal is being
loaded; besides, terminals are also required to unload products using dedicated vacuums
and blades. Last, terminal’s operators (and any other port operators involved in
handling these products) shall be trained in order to minimize commingling. Port
elevating can be operated by the terminal itself or multinational trading companies can
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lease it to other structures: what is important is that GM and non-GM batches are
stored in dedicated facilities with shipping documents kept separately in order to avoid
products misplacement. When the product approaches Italy, the trading company makes
arrangements to unload the non-GM holds in certified facilities. The trading company
is liable if the product does not match the requirements, down to the loading on feed
manufacturers’ trucks. All the upstream documents are forwarded to the final customer
and the imported product receives no further certifications. In the Italian case, in the
main destination port of Ravenna the international trading company, together with port
terminal managers, shipping agents, port supervisors and finals customers agreed on a
common protocol for the management of non-GM covering from inbounding vessels to
truck delivery. Final customers consider this protocol a valuable asset. Additional PCR
tests are carried out when the meal is warehoused at the destination port; these cross tests
are carried out on behalf of final customers and before the product leaves the port heading
to final destinations (storage or processing facilities). Final customers are responsible for
transportation from the port to the processing facilities and to any further stage.
2.4 Factors of uncertainty: hypothesis and results
2.4.1 Quality
We consider non-GM IP products as goods with higher quality compared to conventional
ones. It is not our purpose to discuss whether the actual quality of non-GM IP soybean
meal is effectively higher than its GM alternative; however, since the former requires
higher investments in product quality management (i.e. coexistence measures at field
level, segregation practices for harvesting, transportation, crushing, etc.), this extra costs
must be matched by a price premium, which indicates the perception of a differentiated
product. The uncertainty related to product quality refers to the risk of commingling
the non-GM IP soybean meal with the GM one, which would cause a downgrade of the
product, with negative economic consequences for the entire supply chain. Consistently
with the theory concerning information asymmetry and product quality, we identify the
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following cases:
• Upstream risk of commingling. The main risks that international trading companies
face are incurring in a batch with: 1) more than 0.9% of EU-approved GM
events or, more often, a lower threshold (0.5% is the threshold level required by
the international trader when purchasing non-GM soybean meal from Brazilian
producers); 2) unapproved GM events. If tests for unapproved GM events are
positive and the product was intended for the European market, the ship can
still change its destination while surfing the ocean . The international trading
company has to find a quick alternative, i.e. a non-European destination, in
order to avoid a long stop at the dock (in-port daily costs are very high)possibly
creating stock shortages downstream. On the other hand, if the product had already
reached the port of destination, other measures shall be adopted and the economic
impact changes accordingly . Since the amount of non-GM product is limited and
specifically addressed to specialized feed manufacturers (which need to work at full
capacity) and livestock breeders (mainly small-medium enterprises), any upstream
stock shortage may cause serious problems, both from a legal and economic point
of view. The downgraded product is usually sold at lower prices. The price may
decrease further if a backup destination is not promptly available and the product
needs to be sold as soon as possible. If the GM events in the batch are approved in
the EU, then the product presenting values above thresholds is still marketable at
lower prices. Unfortunately, the regular price would not cover the additional costs
for the segregated non-GM supply chain.
• Downstream risk of commingling: the international trading company is still liable
in case of non-compliance at destination. Even if the international trader purchased
the product with a presence of GM events less than 0.9%, the threshold required
by end-users is usually 0.5% (this way they want to keep safe from the legal
threshold and the risk of GM labelling of feed). Consequently, the international
trading company applies the lower limit of 0.5% to the Brazilian producers. If
the content of GM events in the soybean meal batch in the destination port is
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above the legal threshold, the trader is bound to market the product as GM to
other potential customers. If the product has already been unloaded, the trader
has also the costs of stowing and maintaining the product. Feed manufacturers
bear the risk of commingling after this point: if at the feed processing plant
the legal limit is not respected and the manufacturer discovers it, the batch can
be sold on the conventional market at lower prices. If the feed manufacturer
is integrated downstream with the meat processor, the economic loss refers to a
temporary shortage of feed; this might force the company to buy non-GM feed
directly from the market at higher prices. If the feed manufacturer is not integrated,
a non compliance might create losses of reputation and damage relationship with
customers. Uncertainty related to product quality may cause relevant monetary
and non-monetary losses borne by non-compliant agents, but with negative effects
on the entire supply chain.
With reference to our methodological framework, we expect a non-trivial level of
uncertainty to be controlled through hybrid organizational structures. However, as quality
uncertainty changes from a non-trivial degree to a high one, the buyer has a strong
incentive to adopt stricter organizational forms.
2.4.2 Environmental factors
Besides the uncertainty of quality, we recognize other types of uncertainty linked to
environmental factors, i.e. to unanticipated changes in the circumstances surrounding the
buying firm, with firms unable to write and enforce contracts which account for all future
contingencies (Lee, Yeung, and Cheng 2009). We call this environmental uncertainty
(Walker and Webber, 1984; David and Han, 2004):
• Supply-side uncertainty. As we already stated in the first section, the availability
of non-GM soybeans has been steadily decreasing over the last decade, with
the main international producer (Brazil) increasing the area cultivated with GM
soybean varieties up to 80% of the total soybean area. The availability of non-GM
soybean meal for international trading companies and domestic feed manufacturers
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is primarily related to the opportunity cost of producing GM soybean products by
Brazilian farmers and processors. Several factors affect the choice, ranging from
the management of the supply chain, to the surge of the conventional product
price, resulting from an increasing demand for GM soybean, especially from China
and India, and a steady supply. The availability of non-GM product generates
an opportunity cost issue also for the international trading company. In fact,
according to our interviewed traders the shrinking volumes will probably reduce
the already low logistics efficiency along the supply chain of non-GM goods. This,
together with the uncertainty at the demand level and an increasing demand
for conventional products from developing countries, may support the decision to
market GM soybean only. Domestic non-GM feed manufacturers are bound to
their own (or retailer-driven) technical specifications and, more generally, to specific
non-GM supply chains (Passuello et al., 2013). Being part of a non-GM supply chain
may reduce the incentive for feed producers to switch to GM feed. However the
choice also depends on the availability of substitutes for the non-GM IP Brazilian
soybean meal. This issue is to date highly debated at the European level (Tillie
et al., 2012).
• Demand-side uncertainty. The existing data regarding the awareness of European
consumers towards both biotech crops and food derived from GM varieties are
largely inconsistent across member states (Tille et al., 2012). This variability affects
the incentive of downstream actors to abandon non-GM labelling since the monetary
and organizational costs to maintain segregation might turn out unsustainable in
the long run. In this uncertain scenario, the decision to abandon non-GM products
could prevail and the market could shrink to a niche of producers.
• Price uncertainty. It results from demand-side and supply-side uncertainty. As
regard to the upstream portion of the supply chain for non-GM soybean meal,
the contract between the international trading company and the Brazilian supplier
of non-GM soybean meal envisages a premium price for the non-GM standard;
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however, without a reference market for such premium, it is the results of a
negotiation process based on several factors: the international price for soybean,
the availability of non-GM soybean at the world level, the costs of the segregation
techniques, the characteristics of the demand. The outcome of the negotiation is
uncertain, although an estimate of the final premium is still possible. Clearly,
price premiums have been increasing over the last few years in response to a
shrinking global supply for non-GM soybean; besides the pure market effect of
this contraction, one should also account for the reduction in logistics efficiency
determined by lower volumes. Although the supply-side provides some insightful
information regarding the trend of this premium price, the demand-side effects are
less clear, in particular the willingness to pay for non-GM food. Moreover, estimates
of the demand price elasticity for non-GM food are also missing and probably highly
instable. Hand in hand with the attitude of European customers towards genetically
modified organisms, food producers and more often retailers play a central role on
the pricing mechanisms. Considering the actual price gap between non-GM and GM
soybean meal, it is unlikely that this differential is fully transmitted to consumers,
as the WTP would not be sufficient. Therefore, the price differential must be borne
by some actors along the supply chain. These can be: 1) the producer of branded
products or the retailer with its PL brand (in this case the labelling strategy could
be considered as an investment in brand equity); 2) other upstream actors willing
to accept lower margins to cope with downstream requirements achieving long term
advantages from being part of a specialized supply chain.
Consistently with our methodological approach, we predict the appearance of hybrid
forms of governance in presence of a non-trivial level of environmental uncertainty.
Nonetheless, as uncertainty increases to a high level, according to theory hierarchical
and hybrid governance forms are less suitable to the uncertain market conditions and a
more market-oriented governance form is preferable.
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2.5 Concluding remarks: organizational and managerial
implications
The core of TCE identifies the most appropriate hybrid governance forms depending
on both asset specificity and uncertainty. This work takes into consideration mainly
uncertainty. As expected, the structure of the exchange between the upstream
and downstream agents results from the combined effect of both environmental and
quality-related uncertainty. A high degree of environmental uncertainty drives to a
market-oriented governance form. In fact, both the upstream and downstream agents
adopt a flexible framework based upon yearly contracts with a price premium for the
non-GM standard re-negotiated on an annual basis. These contractual forms are expected
to better manage upstream shortages. On the other hand, the uncertainty related
to product quality is counterbalanced through a set of downstream-driven technical
requirements enforced with process certification schemes. The buyer’s monitoring of the
supplier’s performance is achieved through formalized contracts and process certification.
Contracts between the international trading company and Brazilian producers are
renewed yearly and transactors have been using them for many years, building upon
trust and enduring personal relationships. In accordance with the literature on trust
(Wei, Wong and Lai, 2012; Whan and Kwon, 2004) and transaction’s long-term
orientation (Joshi et al., 1999), we observe that the long-lasting trust-based relationships
between local crushers and international trading company may serve as a flexible vertical
coordination mechanism to reduce uncertainty and transaction costs. The main benefits
of the relationship are:
• a stabilization of the price premium that the international trading company
recognizes to Brazilian producers for non-GM soybean: this is of particular
relevance, as there is no reference market for this premium;
• a secure market channel for Brazilian producers, i.e. a lower incentive to switch to
GM crops;
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• a stable and reliable supply of non-GM crops to the international trader.
The frequency of transactions between the international trading company and Brazilian
crushers seems to play a key role in building trust. The exchange between the international
trading company and feedstuff manufacturers is mainly managed through spot contracts.
However, if we take into consideration the relationship between the trader and the main
Italian customer, we cannot classify this transaction as pure market governance, where the
identity of the transacting parties is irrelevant and no mutual dependency exists. What
we notice is that the two parties maintain their autonomy but are bilaterally dependent
in a nontrivial way: their identity matters and each of them cannot be replaced costlessly.
The degree of uncertainty heavily affects the structure of the transaction: the volatility
of demand and supply conditions may reduce the buyer’s capacity to control the supplier.
However, at this point of the supply chain, other economic determinants play a crucial role
in shaping the transaction’s governance form. The relatively small volumes of non-GM
soybean meal necessary to satisfy the Italian demand resulted in a single international
trader supplying the market. In this context, the buyer can control the supplier only
through bilateral consent on product technical specifications and information/product
management. This is usually done by large feed processors, such those integrated
in the poultry sector, while relatively smaller feed manufacturers are more price and
quality takers. Additionally, the feed manufacturer aims at establishing a trust-based
and long-term oriented relationship with the international trader in order to curb the
transaction costs arising from uncertainty. These are not necessarily specific to non-GM
supply: as we observe from interviews, large Italian feed manufacturer have been doing
business with one particular trading company, mainly because of the reputation of the
upstream suppliers and the trust relationship between the two companies’ staff2.
2The importance of this trust relationship may be emphasized by some cases of product
non-compliances, where the international trader claimed responsibility for it and paid the price gap
between the GM and the non-GM final product
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3. ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN DEMAND FOR
SOYBEAN GRAINS AND MAIZE
3.1 Background and objectives
3.1.1 Background
Soybean
Soybean is currently the most important agricultural product traded on the international
market, both in terms of volume and value. The reasons for the world-wide success of this
leguminous plant can be substantially attributed to its remarkable protein content and the
reduced fat fraction; these nutritional characteristics, along with its flexibility in feedstuff
preparation, make soybean a preferable choice over most protein sources available for
livestock breeding (Bertheau and Davison, 2011). Whereas soybean is not an essential
feed for dairy and beef cattle, things change dramatically when it comes to poultry and
hogs. Soybean meal is in fact a major source of highly disposable lysine, an essential
amino acid which represents an important growth promoter and a limiting factor in pigs,
chickens and turkeys (Tillie et al., 2012; De Visser et al., 2014).
Since the ban of high-protein meat and bone meals in early 2000, the abolishment of
oilseeds import duties (Dillon round, 1962) and the hike in European domestic costs
for feed grains, soybean has been largely introduced in European feedstuff formulations
for intensively bred livestock (Bertheau and Davison, 2011). This escalation in demand
has been mainly supported through imports: roughly 70% of protein-rich feed materials
were imported into the EU in 2012 (64% of which is soybean meal), while only 3% of
EU-27 arable land was dedicated to high-protein crops in 2013 (Bouxin, 2013; Ha¨usling,
2011). It is clear that, up to now, the European agricultural sector cannot meet the
compelling need for high-protein feed. The limited European supply of oilseeds has to
do with two aspects: first, the unfavourable climate conditions in most member states
hinder the cultivation of high-protein crops, in particular soybean; second, the frequent
changes in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have strongly influenced farmers’
cropping decisions (Bertheau and Davison, 2011). Whereas continental climate with
Fig. 3.1: Member States’ soybean crop area (x 1000 ha).
Source: Eurostat (2015).
cool springs and dry early summer does not represent the best growing condition for
soybean, political decisions had also influenced farmers’ decision remarkably: with the
2005 Fischler Reform of the CAP, financial aids to European farmers became decoupled
from production, thus aids were no longer related to oilseeds production and yields. The
attempt was to link agricultural aid to environmental preservations and sustainability
through the reinforcement the CAP’s second pillar (Krautgartner et al., 2010; Bertheau
and Davison, 2011). Since European farming is highly dependent on the CAP (Carlier
et al., 2010; Cavaille`s, 2009), these reforms have fuelled a shift in farmers’ cultivation
schemes since most crops (including soybean) are now driven by global market prices
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only. Italy is so far the European largest producer of soybeans (166 thousand of hectares
in 2014, see figure 3.1 for details), followed by Romania (86 thousand of hectares in 2014),
France (74.6 thousand of hectares in 2014), Croatia (50 thousand of hectares in 2014),
Austria (43.8 thousand of hectares in 2014), Hungary (42.3 thousand of hectares in 2014)
and Slovakia (33.4 thousand of hectares in 2014). As a result of the former USSR research
Fig. 3.2: EU28 soybean import statistics (millions of metric tons).
Source: Eurostat (2015).
in soybean breeding and the following adoption of these varieties within the former soviet
block, eastern member states represents an important area for soybean cultivation; in
particular, Romania and Hungary together invested over 125 thousand hectares in 2014,
almost 26% of EU28 arable land dedicated to soybean.
The EU imports soybean as both crushed grains (soybean meal) and whole grains: official
statistics indicate that Europe imported roughly 13 millions metric tons (MMT) of grains
and 18 MMT of meal 2014, while the average import for the period 2006-2014 was 14.5
mmt and 21 mmt, respectively (see figure 3.2).
While the 15% decline in imported soybean meal is the likely consequence a remarkable
soar in soybean’s future prices in years 2008 through 2013 (see figure 3.3), the 10% drop in
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grain imports has also to do with the substantial decrease in European crushing capacity
(De Visser et al., 2014). Since the EU imports soybean meal almost exclusively from Brazil
Fig. 3.3: Soybean World Price (expressed in Euro).
Source: World Bank (2015).
and Argentina (Management Committee for the Common Organisation of Agricultural
Markets, 2012), the following analysis will focus on the EU import of soybean grains
(soybeans).
The EU soybeans import structure for 2014 is presented in table 3.1, while table 3.2
indicates the average soybeans import for the period 2000 through 2014. United States
and Brazil are clearly the two nations which mostly contribute to European Union’s
international demand for soybean grains, followed by Paraguay and Canada. On the other
hand, Argentina clearly plays a marginal role when we consider unprocessed soybean;
therefore, we will not include Argentina in the analysis of the EU import structure.
It is now clear that the low self-sufficiency ratio and the consequent reliance on the
international market, exposes the EU to possible trade distortions: scarcity, excess price
volatility and problems of GMOs-related issues may undermine the sustainability of a
significantly import-tied livestock sector.
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Tab. 3.1: 2014 Soybeans import sources by volume (millions of metrics tons) and value
(millions of Euro).
U.S.A. Argentina Brazil Canada Paraguay
Volume
4.21 0.058 5.75 0.86 1.24
34.8% 0.5% 47.5% 7% 10.2%
Value
1638 25 2364 316 509
33.8% 0.5% 48.7% 6.5% 10.5%
Source: Eurostat (2015).
Maize
Maize is currently cultivated on nearly 185 million hectares all over the world (FAO, 2015)
and represents the most popular cereal in many developing countries such as Southern and
Eastern Africa, Central America and Mexico (Ranum et al., 2014). In such geographical
areas, maize is largely devoted to human consumption while its main use in developed
countries has long been shifted to feed processing. However, with the fast economic
growth which enabled most consumers to access animal produces such as milk, eggs and
meat, the share of maize dedicated to livestock feed production in developing countries
has recently soared (Shiferaw et al., 2011). This shift in maize allocation is particularly
observed in Asian countries like China and India. At the global level, the use of maize as a
source of food accounts for roughly 15% of the total demand but the share almost doubles
when it comes to developing countries. On the other hand, roughly 63% of the global
maize demand is absorbed by livestock breeders, while the amount of product dedicated
to feed production declines to 56% in developing countries (Shiferaw et al., 2011). There
are however significant variations in alternative uses at the country level across developing
and developed world. According to the European Commission, roughly 64% of the maize
imported/produced in the EU was employed to produce animal feed during the marketing
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Tab. 3.2: Soybeans import sources by volume (millions of metric tons) and value (millions of
Euro), 2000-2014 average.
U.S.A. Argentina Brazil Canada Paraguay
Volume
3.86 0.25 7.37 0.61 1.07
30% 2% 56% 4.7% 8%
Value
1,132 75 2,116 207 350
29% 2% 55% 5% 9%
Source: Eurostat (2015).
year (MY) 2013/2014. On the other hand, nearly 0.5% of the domestic supply was
absorbed by the seed industry, while industrial use other than feed production (of which
biofuel is the most relevant one) and human consumption were responsible for the 10% and
5.2% of domestic use (European Commission, 2015b). Table 3.3 reports the EU balance
sheet for maize products from MY 2007/2008 to MY 2013/2014. The 16% increase
in total supply that the EU experienced during the last seven years has been mainly
driven by the hike in demand for maize feed products and maize for industrial uses
(+14% and +39%, respectively). In particular, the soar in maize demand for industrial
uses coincides with the rapid expansion of the European biofuel industry; in fact, the
European balance sheet reports that the share of maize employed for bioethanol and/or
biofuel production has increased by 79% since MY 2007/2008 (European Commission,
2015b). This trend is obviously not unique to the EU: nearly 50 developing countries have
already established blending mandates and maize represents the primary feedstock within
the famous US ”Corn Ethanol” program (Shiferaw et al., 2011). France is the European
(EU28) largest producer of maize (3,259.9 thousand of hectares in 2014, see figure 3.4 for
details), followed by Germany (2,573.9 thousand of hectares in 2014), Romania (2,552.4
thousand of hectares in 2014), Hungary (1,266 thousand of hectares in 2014), Poland
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Tab. 3.3: European balance sheet for maize. Data reported in MMT. Total supply includes
initial stocks.
’07/’08 ’08/’09 ’09/’10 ’10/’11 ’11/’12 ’12/’13 ’13/’14
Production 48.3 63.1 57.6 57.1 68.6 58.3 66.4
Import 15.1 4 2.4 7.5 6.2 11 15
Total supply 79.2 81.4 77.8 79.4 88.3 86.1 94.6
Domestic uses
Human consumption 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.9
Seed production 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Industrial use 5.8 6.9 7.5 8.5 8.1 8.3 9.5
Animal feed 52.2 48.2 48.1 50.2 54 57 60.6
Source: European Commission (2015b).
(1,219.5 thousand of hectares in 2014), Italy (1,215.9 thousand of hectares in 2014) and
Spain (531.5 thousand of hectares in 2014).
Differently from soybean, the EU import of maize products1 is not as compelling as
it is for high-protein crops. Maize import represented only 10% (on average) of total
European supply for the seven year period 2007/2008 to 2013/2014. In fact, maize can
be easily grown in most EU member states thanks to favourable weather conditions and
the remarkable supply of hybrids suitable to most pedoclimatic situations. In addition,
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) rules for the imposition of import duties on cereals
depending on international market conditions. Even through the EU has set bound
duties for all cereals under the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), for
some cereals the rates imposed are different. This system dates back to the Blair House
Agreement (November 1992) between the United States and the EU and consists of
applying tariffs based on individual world reference prices for specific cereal products. The
duty is computed as the difference between the effective EU intervention price multiplied
1The European Union imports maize as whole grains (we will hereafter refer to maize grains as simply
”maize”), bran, starch, flour and distilled dried grains.
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Fig. 3.4: Member States’ maize crop area (x 1000 ha).
Source: Eurostat (2015).
by 1.55 and a representative CIF (i.e. cost, insurance and freight) import price at the
Rotterdam port (European Commission, 2014). For example, in July 2014 the European
Commission announced the introduction of an import duty on maize, sorghum and rye to
be set at 5.32 Euro per tonne. The decision came in response to the troublesome situation
on the international markets which resulted in particularly low prices.
3.1.2 Source differentiation
Even though soybean and maize are often referred as undifferentiated commodities,
within an importing area like the EU imports from one source are likely to be perceived
as imperfect substitutes for the same products from another exporter. If not, price
ratios would be constant and elasticities of substitution between these supplies would
be infinite (Armington, 1969). This imperfect substitution is typically due to a variety
of source-specific features; for example, different countries may have different reputations
for products’ quality, quality consistency, reliability, supply chain management, etc.
(Washington and Kilmer, 2002a). In this regard, soybean and maize do not make
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an exception for at least three reasons: first, soybean and maize originated from
different overseas countries may show uneven nutritional characteristics; second, different
exporting countries may show different authorization statuses for genetically modified
(GM) events which have not yet been approved for food and feed use in the EU;
third, products originating from countries with more efficient supply chain management
are typically perceived as qualitatively superior2 (Nakamura et al., 1998; Foster, 2008).
Moreover, exporting countries’ characteristics may change over time; that is, supply chain
management may improve (Schwab et al., 2011), GMOs regulation and adoption may
change (James, 2010) and the agricultural sector may evolve, particularly in areas such
as South America and Asia. Additionally, soybean and maize quality and availability
may differ from year to year consequently to transformations in the agricultural systems
(Veeman and Gray, 2010) and bad/good growing seasons.
Nutritional Characteristics
Soybeans nutritional characteristics are highly dependent on country-specific features:
transportation and storage conditions, management at the origination port, genetics and
growing conditions are key parameters for quality (Northern Crops Institute, 2013).
According to Grieshop and Fahey (2001), Karr-Lilienthal et al. (2004), and Park
and Hurburgh Jr (2002), significant quality differences in soybeans and soybean meal
originated from either South America, North America or Eastern Countries have been
consistently found in several nutritional studies. In particular, the analysis performed
by Grieshop and Fahey (2001) on soybeans harvested in different Brazilian, Chinese
and North American states/provinces/regions showed that North American and Chinese
samples had higher crude proteins (CP) and lysine levels. Similarly, Park and Hurburgh Jr
(2002) results indicate that soybean meal originated from the US is more consistent and
has higher feeding value (more digestible, higher in protein, and better quality protein)
than meal from other geographic areas. However, Park and Hurburgh Jr (2002) analysis
2for example, the absence of unapproved GM goods at the ports’ harbours would make such workflow
a desirable country-specific feature (Pelaez et al., 2010).
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is not performed on soybean grains but on soybean meal; in such a case, other factors
pertaining to the oil extraction process might have influenced the nutritional features of
the product. Karr-Lilienthal et al. (2004) also found that Chinese beans had a larger CP
fraction and lysine level than South American (Brazil and Argentina) and US samples
but, in this case, Brazil performed slightly better than North America. In addition, Ku
et al. (2013) found that pigs fed with Korean soybean meal had greater final body weight
than those fed with diets containing soybean meal originated from India or Brazil and,
overall, that Korean meal had better quality than that imported from Brazil or India.
These empirical findings clearly show that soybean samples harvested in different
geographic areas have heterogeneous qualitative attributes. This stream of literature
is in line with the early works conducted by Rose (1988); Wolf et al. (1982) and Cure
et al. (1982) who demonstrated that the amount of CP and oil can be the result, among
the others, of different growing conditions such as rainfall (Rose, 1988), temperature
(Wolf et al., 1982) and photo-period (Cure et al., 1982). Bellaloui and Mengistu (2008)
also discuss how alternative irrigation regimes and cultivar differences may severely affect
yields and seeds’ composition under different environmental conditions; in particular,
full season and/or reproductive stage irrigation schemes may or may not convey higher
CP fractions depending on the cultivar adopted and the crop year. This implies that
the availability of drought-resistant varieties, water and agricultural know-how is key for
obtaining the ”best” seed composition.
Consistently with the above literature, we will hereafter refer to (North) American
soybean as the ”highest quality” product with respect to its CP and lysine portions. By
contrast, Brazilian soybean will be inevitably ranked below the US one. Unfortunately,
there are no up to date empirical studies concerned with the assessment of Paraguayan
or Canadian soybean quality. For example, the analysis by Mounts et al. (1990) provides
some bits of evidence concerning Paraguay: the authors found that Paraguayan grains
had overall higher CP levels then soybeans originated from the US and Brazil. However,
these results are based on a single sample collected in 1988, 10 years before the time series
we will use for our analysis.
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Similarly, we found no up-to date studies concerning the assessment of nutritional
characteristics of maize samples from different countries. Given this lack of information,
we cannot make a-priori assumptions regarding maize grading across international
suppliers.
GMOs and asynchronous approval
The rate of adoption of GM soybean and maize in most of world-major exporting
countries has rapidly increased over the last decade (Tillie et al., 2012; James, 2010;
Kalaitzandonakes, 2011), with a rather fast introduction of the newest varieties. Such
phenomenon may undermine export opportunities toward the EU, where imported
soybean and maize must be labelled as ”containing Genetically Modified Organisms”
if the GM material exceeds the 0.9% threshold and such material must include
only varieties approved by the EU legislation. Although globally traded, GMO’s
approval for commercialization is still regulated by national legal schemes only. These
regulations comprise, among others, approval for importing, cultivation, labelling policy
and traceability. All these regulatory dimensions vary remarkably among different
countries (Vigani et al., 2012; Davison, 2010; Berwald et al., 2006). This generates the
well-known issue of asynchronous approval: since the authorization process in the major
GM-producing countries is typically quicker than in the EU, it is common that newly
approved GMOs in these countries still await for authorization in the EU, such that
traces of these newly approved products cannot be present in imported batches because
of the European ”zero tolerance policy” for unauthorized GM. Considering that a perfect
segregation of approved and unapproved GM crops cannot be consistently achieved, then
one should expect that a larger gap in the number of approved varieties should result
in higher threaten of trade disruptions. Therefore, even if a complete segregation is not
feasible in practice, an efficient upstream product management (especially at the ports’
harbours) is a key country-specific feature to minimize the risk of low level presence3. The
3The accidental presence of small amounts of biotech events that have undergone full safety
assessment and have received regulatory approval for all possible uses in one or more countries but
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”zero tolerance policy” has already challenged EU agricultural imports (Henseler et al.,
2013) thereby fostering the economic research on the role of asynchronous approval as
key trade determinant (Henseler et al., 2013; Kalaitzandonakes, 2011; Carter and Smith,
2007). Most of these works are aimed at assessing either ex-post market disruptions
caused by non-compliant imports (Schmitz et al., 2005; Carter and Smith, 2007) or the
potential economic turmoil caused by discontinued trade relationship (Philippidis, 2010;
Magnier et al., 2009).
When discussing of any potential GMO-related trade issue, it is worth distinguishing
between the whole amount of approved GM events and the share of approved GM events
which are effectively commercialized for food and feed use. We want to provide a measure
for this asynchronism using the Protectionism Index introduced by de Faria and Wieck
(2015), which extends the Protectionism Index developed by Li and Beghin (2014) with
a time dimension, in order to assess the extent of asynchronous approval over time. The
Index is defined as follows:
AAjit ≡ 1
Mt
(
Mt∑
mt=1
exp
(Rimt −Rjmt)
max (Rmt)−min (Rmt)
)
where the subscripts j, i and t indicate the importing country, the exporting country and
the year, respectively4. Moreover, M denotes the total number of GMO events available
for a given product (soybean or maize in this case), m indicates a particular GMO event,
Rmt defines the rank of the approval status for a GMO event m while Rimt and Rjmt
represent the rank of approval for m in the exporting country i and the importing country
j, respectively. Note that Rmt can take on values from one (most restrictive approval
status) to four (least restrictive approval status), with Rmt = 1 indicating that event
m is not approved for any use, Rmt = 2 if m is approved for feed use only, Rmt = 3
if m is approved for food use only and Rmt = 4 is m is approved for both feed and
food use. Since the present analysis considers only one importer (the European Union),
are still unauthorized in others due to regulatory asynchronicity or expiration of their approvals?
(Kalaitzandonakes, 2011)
4In details: j = European Union, i ∈ {U.S., Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Paraguay} and t ∈
{2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012}.
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the subscript j can be omitted so that AAjit = AAit. AAit ranges from 0 to e with
AAit = 1 indicating no difference in approval statuses between the importing and the
exporting countries, AAit ∈ [0, 1] if the importing country is less stringent than the
exporting country and AAit ∈ [1, e] if the approval status of the importing country is
more stringent than those of the exporting country. If the approval status in the EU
is stricter than in country i, then AAit will be non-decreasing in stringency
5. The data
employed for the Protectionism Index are obtained from de Faria and Wieck’s dataset
directly; in particular, the main sources regarding the approval status of GM events are
the ISAAA GM Approval Database (ISAAA, 2013) and the CERA GM Crop Database
(CERA, 2013), which provide names and codes of each GMO event as well as the countries
that have already authorized the event, the first year of approval, and the type of approval
(feed, food, feed and food and cultivation). Information about events currently marketed
in at least one country is provided by the Biotechnology Industry Organization through
the on-line Biotradestatus database (BIO, 2013).
As shown in table 3.4, when we consider soybeans imported from USA, Canada, Brazil and
Paraguay, there are significant differences between North American and South American
countries. Similarly, the maize Protectionism Index shows that whereas Ukraine and
South American countries are on average as restrictive as or more restrictive than the
EU, the US commercialize more GM varieties than the EU.
As de Faria and Wieck (2014, 2015) have recently shown, dissimilarity across country pairs
(i.e.: EU vs major exporting countries) have been increasing over time in terms of globally
approved events. Nevertheless, if the focus is shifted to commercialized events only, the
study indicates a substantially synchronization between the EU and the major soybean
and maize exporting countries. According to the authors, this could result from a strategic
behaviour adopted by exporting countries in order to mitigate the impact of asynchronous
approval and avoid potential trade disruption with key commercial partners. Nevertheless,
the persistence of this sychronicity is highly dependent on the future discrepancies between
5Since the European Union has not approved any commercially available event for soybean, AAit is
always non-decreasing in stringency.
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Tab. 3.4: Protectionism Indexes.
USA Brazil Canada Paraguay Ukraine Argentina
Soybean
Mean 2.23 1.58 2.23 1.13 - -
Max 2.71 1.85 2.71 1.85 - -
Min 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.52 - -
Std.dev 0.71 0.4 0.71 0.4 - -
Maize
Mean 1.68 0.85 - - 0.70 0.96
Max 1.89 1.04 - - 0.77 1.07
Min 1.53 0.64 - - 0.64 0.85
Std.dev 0.14 0.17 - - 0.04 0.08
Source: de Faria and Wieck (2014, 2015).
country pairs. These findings strengthen the hypothesis that asynchronous approval is
a key feature when considering trade between GM-intensive countries and the European
Union.
Efficiency of supply chain management
In order to assess differences in supply chain efficiency between USA, Canada, Brazil
and Paraguay, we consider the Port Infrastructure Quality Index (PIQ hereafter) and
the Overall Infrastructure Quality (OIQ hereafter) index provided by World Economic
Forum’s ”The Global Competitiveness Report” (Sachs et al., 1999, 2000, 2002; Cornelius
et al., 2003; Sala-i Martin et al., 2004, 2005; Lopez-Carlos et al., 2006, 2007; Porter
et al., 2008; Porter and Schwab, 2009; Schwab, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) from 1999 to
2013, as suggested by Clark et al. (2004). These indexes are based on the so-called
”Executive Opinion Survey” (Schwab, 2013) whose main goal is to achieve a quantitative
assessment of those country-specific variables for which primary source data are scarce
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or, more frequently, unavailable. The survey is designed to capture the perceptions of
business executives relatively to a broad range of countries’ business dimensions: these
include infrastructures, competition, labour market, institutions, etc. Respondents are
asked to evaluate the conditions of the business environment they are competent about
through a 1 to 7 ranking list, where 1 represents the worst operating situation, while 7
indicates excellence. To ensure results’ consistency across countries, the World Economic
Forum establishes collaborative agreements with a number of partner institutions in each
nation included in the report; these partners are typically national universities, research
centres and/or small/medium/large business organizations. The way country scores are
computed is well described in each Report’s issue; however, it is worth mentioning that
by 2008 the World Economic Forum has introduced a new way to compute such indexes:
from the 2007-2008 Report to the most recent releases, country scores are obtained using
a moving average approach (Porter et al., 2008).
The reason why consider the PIQ and the OIQ indexes is that: since the major soybean
and maize exporters are mainly located in North and South America, the smoothness of
port operations, as well as the effectiveness of transaction procedures such as commingling,
traceability, identity preservation, etc. represent remarkably important features for
economies competing on the international market. In this regard, ports have historically
been referred as bottlenecks in maritime transportation because of their complex internal
organisation and the considerable number of companies or, more generally, agents in
charge of moving goods between ships, from inbound vectors to loading sites or between
warehouses (Lo´pez and Poole, 1998). The provision of port services has therefore become
crucial in modern international logistics and should provide a good indicator to assess
how efficiently the product flow is managed. Table 3.5 reports the PIQ index for USA,
Brazil, Canada, Paraguay, Ukraine and Argentina for the years 2000, 2006 and 2012:
Coherently with the available literature (Koopman and Laney, 2012; World Bank, 2010),
Brazil is the country with the poorer port infrastructures, while Canada has performed
better than both USA and South American countries. The data for Ukraine is less relevant
as maize is mostly shipped to the EU by train or truck.
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Tab. 3.5: Port infrastructure quality index for years 2000, 2006 and 2012.
U.S.A. Brazil Canada Paraguay Ukraine Argentina
PIQ 2000 6.0 3.3 6.1 NA 3.4 4.0
PIQ 2006 6.0 2.7 5.7 2.3 3.7 3.6
PIQ 2012 5.5 2.7 5.8 3.4 3.7 3.7
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2000, 2005-2006 and 2011-2012
(Sachs et al., 2000; Lopez-Carlos et al., 2006; Schwab, 2012).
We also consider the OIQ index in order to account for other supply chain physical
components besides ports; in particular, the index encompasses the respondents’
perceptions concerning, among the others, the quality of roads, railways, airports,
telephone lines, internet access. Table 3.6 reports the OIQ index for USA, Brazil, Canada,
Paraguay, Ukraine and Argentina for years 2000, 2006 and 2012.
Tab. 3.6: Overall infrastructure quality index for years 2000, 2006 and 2012.
U.S.A. Brazil Canada Paraguay Ukraine Argentina
OIQ 2000 6.6 3.1 6.3 NA 2.7 3.4
OIQ 2006 6.5 2.8 6.1 2.0 3.4 3.6
OIQ 2012 5.7 3.6 6.0 2.5 4.2 3.5
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2000, 2005-2006 and 2011-2012
(Sachs et al., 2000; Lopez-Carlos et al., 2006; Schwab, 2012).
Once again, the index highlights that USA and Canada are affine in terms of
infrastructures’ quality, while South American countries still lag behind.
3.1.3 Objectives
We aim at estimating the European soybean and maize import demand distinguished
by country of origin in order to provide own-price and cross-price (i.e. cross-country)
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elasticities which are not currently available in the literature and might be supportive for
further policy analysis. Cross-price elasticities will provide information about the presence
of complementarity or substitution among different countries of origin. Depending on
the sign of the estimated coefficients, demand dynamics might be dictated by source
differentiation based on either pure product availability/price or, alternatively, on different
country-specific product attributes (i.e. nutritional characteristics, asynchronous approval
and supply chain efficiency). Although most import demand analysis are still performed
through structural functional forms derived from consumer theory (Seale Jr et al., 2013;
Mutondo and Henneberry, 2007; Boonsaeng et al., 2008), we proceed with the estimation
of the European import allocation structure using a differential approach based on
production theory.
3.2 Methodology
The methodology we use in the present analysis is based on Theil (1977); Laitinen
and Theil (1978); Theil (1980); Davis and Jensen (1994); Washington and Kilmer
(2002b,a). and Christou et al. (2005). The European derived demand for soybean
grains is modelled through a Differential Factor Allocation Model (DFAM), following
the differential approach to the theory of the firm initially proposed by Theil (1977)
and Laitinen and Theil (1978). The production theory approach to international trade
is preferred to traditional methodologies which consider imports as final goods entering
the consumers’ utility functions directly. Therefore, demand is not derived from utility
maximization but from a two step profit maximization or cost minimization approach
(Washington and Kilmer, 2002b; Laitinen and Theil, 1978).
3.2.1 Theoretical framework
The production theory approach to trade modelling was initially proposed by Burgess
(1974a,b); Kohli (1978, 1991); Davis and Jensen (1994); Diewert (1986) and Truett and
Truett (1998).
Early works recognized that most traded products are not delivered to the final consumers
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directly; rather, it is more appropriate to consider these goods as inputs of firms
displaced at some point along of the supply chain 6. Therefore, the proposal was to
exploit production theory in order to estimate the domestic import demand through an
industry-level profit maximization or cost-minimization approach (Burgess, 1974a; Kohli,
1978).
In particular, Davis and Jensen (1994) encompass the weaknesses of utility-maximization
when dealing with imported inputs. First of all, the authors recognize the conceptual
flaw by which most imported agricultural goods are not final products; indeed, it
is acknowledged that most of imported products require further processing, handling,
packaging, storing and retailing before they are delivered to the final consumer. It follows
that the definition of first-stage utility aggregates may be often questionable because
weak separability for agricultural commodities is not straightforward. As a consequence,
elasticity estimates of these classes of models might not be structural parameters, thereby
leading to erroneous interpretation of the estimated coefficients.
The assumption that import decision is made by profit maximizing/cost minimizing firms
has several advantages: on the one hand, there is no need to specify a model for the
final demand (through a specification of consumers’ utility functional form) and, on the
other hand, aggregation over consumers is also no longer necessary (Washington and
Kilmer, 2002b; Kohli, 1991). Indeed, aggregation represents a substantial advantage of
trade models derived from production theory with respect to consumers’ utility-based
models: given that import data are typically reported in the form of aggregate statistics,
the derived demand we estimate is actually an industry-level derived demand or, in
other words, a derived demand aggregated over firms. According to Mas-Colell et al.
(1995), when considering firms’ optimizing behaviour, properties derived from producer
behaviour typically hold after aggregation over firms, whereas this is not always true
when aggregating across consumers. The aggregate profit obtained when each producer
maximizes its individual profit is the same that would be obtained if the whole industry
6These enterprises are typically international trading companies when it comes to agricultural
commodities
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would coordinate to take a joint profit-maximizing decision under the same set of input
and prices. Analogously, the industry’s cost of production for the joint output corresponds
to the sum of each firm of individual total costs if each individual is a price taker. In other
words, if G represent the number of firms in the industry, then the industry-aggregate
cost function can be defined as (Chambers, 1988):
C (p, z) =
G∑
g=1
cg(p, zg)
where cg(·) is the cost function associated to the gth enterprise, p is the vector of
input prices and zg is the vector of output quantities for firm g. On the other hand,
consumers’ aggregate demand satisfies all the properties of the individual demand if and
only if preferences and wealth are homogeneous across individuals; as many empirical
studies have found, however, whenever homogeneity between individuals is not satisfied,
symmetry does not typically hold (Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Washington and Kilmer,
2002b).
The more recent work proposed by Washington and Kilmer (2002b,a) and Muhammad
and Kilmer (2008) employs a Differential Factor Allocation Model (DFAM, Laitinen and
Theil (1978)) to specify the derived demand function of a variety of products in different
countries. Following Davis and Jensen (1994) this methodology is consistent with a direct
industry-level profit-maximization procedure.
General approach
Assume that a given industry has a inter-temporally separable and homothetically
(weakly) separable transformation function in each time period; then, the industry-level
technology can be indicated as:
F = {Zl, Qi; l = 1, ...,M ; i = 1, ..., N}
= F (Z1, ..., ZM , Q1, ..., QN) = 0
where l indicates the output, i indicates the input, Zl represents the aggregate outputs
quantity and Qi stands for aggregate inputs. Consider the set of indices of the input
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vector I = {i}i=1,...,N and a subset I ⊃ Ij = {j}j=1,...,J , then the aggregate inputs are
defined as linearly homogeneous aggregation functions
Qi = Qi({qij; j = 1, ..., J}) = Qi(qi1, ..., qiJ), ∀i = 1, ..., N
where Qi and qij are scalars representing the aggregate and disaggregate input quantities,
respectively (Davis and Jensen, 1994). Similarly, consider the set of indeces of the output
vector L = {l}l=1,...,M and a subset L ⊃ Lk = {k}k=1,...,K , then the aggregate outputs are
dfined as linearly aggregation functions
Zl = Zl ({zlk; k = 1, . . . , K}) = Zl (zl1, . . . , zlK) , ∀l = 1, . . . ,M
Define now the industry-level aggregate profit maximization problem
max
Z,Q
Π = ZW′ −PQ′
s.t. F (Z1, ..., ZM , Q1, ..., QN) = F (Z,Q) ∈ Y
where Y is the production set, Z and W are (1×M) vectors output quantities and prices
while Q and P are (1×N) vectors of aggregate input quantities and prices, respectively.
As for Qi and Zl, Pi and Wl are defined as a linear homogeneous aggregation function:
Pi = Pi(pi1, ..., piJ) ∀i = 1, ..., N
Wl = Wl(wl1, ..., wlK) ∀l = 1, ...,M
with pij representing the factor price corresponding to the disaggregate input qij and
wlk being the output price corresponding to the disaggregate input zlk. Given a vector of
solutions to the optimization problem, Q∗, the aggregate profit function Π∗ = ZW′−PQ∗′
is evaluated at the optimum bundle. The aggregate input demand is obtained though the
Hotelling’s lemma (Mas-Colell et al., 1995):
−∂Π
∗
∂Pi
= Qi(W,P), ∀i = 1, ..., N
where Qi(W,P) is the homogeneous of degree zero aggregate demand function for input
i (Davis and Jensen, 1994). However, the aim of the present framework is to obtain
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disaggregate factor demands; for example, consider Ij to be the ”oilseed” input partition,
then Qi(W,P) would represent the aggregate demand function for oilseeds and qij would
be the disaggregate demand for soybean grains, for j = soybean grains. Disaggregate
conditional Hicksian demand functions can be derived under the assumption of an
homothetically separable transformation function in the Ij partition (Hotelling lemma).
Differentiating the aggregate profit function Π∗ with respect to disaggregated input prices
pij (Davis and Jensen, 1994; Blackorby et al., 1978) leads to
∂Π∗
∂pij
=
∂Π∗
∂pij
∂Pi
∂pij
= −Qi ∂Pi
∂pij
Given the linear homogeneity of the aggregator function Qi, then:
Pi(pi1, ..., piJ)Qi(qi1, ..., qiJ) =
J∑
s=1
pijqij, s ∈ {j = 1, ..., J} (3.1)
Differentiating (3.1) with respect to qij gives:
Pi
∂Qi
∂qij
= pij, ∀j = 1, ..., J (3.2)
while differentiating (3.1) with respect to pij and re-arranging gives:
∂Pi
∂pij
Qi ≡ qij +
J∑
s=1
[
pis − Pi∂Qi
∂qis
]
∂qis
∂pij
, s ∈ {j = 1, ..., J} (3.3)
Substituting (3.2) into (3.3) gives:
∂Pi
∂pij
Qi = qij (3.4)
Therefore:
−∂Π
∗
∂pij
= Qi
∂Pi
∂pij
= qij
Using duality, the optimal quantity q∗ij can be also obtained through cost minimization.
The problem
min
Qi
PQ’
s.t. F (Z,Q) ∈ Y
Qi = Qi(qi1, ..., qiJ)
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has solution at Q∗. Analogously to Hotelling’s lemma for the aggregate profit function,
the aggregate input demand is obtained using Shephard’s lemma (Mas-Colell et al., 1995);
consider the aggregate cost function C (P,Z) = PQ (W,P) ≡ PQ∗ = C∗, then:
∂C∗
∂pij
= Q∗i , ∀i = 1, ..., N
Under the assumption of a weakly-separable technology, the aggregate cost function is also
weakly separable (Chambers, 1988) and differentiating C∗ with respect to disaggregated
input prices pij leads to (Shepard’s lemma):
∂C∗
∂pij
=
∂C∗
∂pij
∂Pi
∂pij
= Qi
∂Pi
∂pij
Using (3.1) through (3.4) in the same fashion, we obtain:
∂C∗
∂pij
= qij
which represents the conditional Hicksian demand function qhij (pi, Qi), where pi =
(pi1, . . . , piJ)
′. The term ”conditional” is appropriate because qhij is conditional on the
aggregate input quantity Qi. Following production theory, q
h
ij is homogeneous of degree
zero in pi (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). In the following application I
j will represent the
”soybean grains” partition, while j will indicate the import source.
3.2.2 The Differential Factor Allocation Model
Laitinen and Theil (1978) developed a Differential Factor Allocation Model starting from
the cost minimization problem of a multi-product firm. We formally derived the reference
structural equations in Appendix B. The following expression indicates the multi-product
firm’s differential demand for input i, conditional on the Divisia volume index Q:
hid log q
∗
i = θid logQ+ γΨi − ψ
n∑
j=1
θi,jd
[
log pj/P˜
]
where hi ≡ piqi/C indicates the share of the ith input as a proportion of the total cost
C, d logQ ≡∑ni=1 hid log q∗i defines the Divisia volume index which captures the change
in input elementary quantities7, θi,j are the conditional own/cross-input price coefficients
7Q represents the total input decision
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and P˜ is the Fisher’s price index. Last, the term Ψi ≡ γ
∑m
l=1 gl
(
θli − θi
)
d log zl indicate
the sample covariance between the amount of output l and input i’s contribution to the
marginal cost of that output. Therefore, whenever the change in output is positively
correlated with the marginal share of the input, a change in the lth output determines an
increase in the demand for input i in excess of θid logQ. As formally shown in appendix
B, under the additional assumption of input-output separability, the contribution of the
ith input to the marginal cost of the lth output does not change across outputs (θli = θi),
hence Ψi = 0 and the model simplifies to:
hid log q
∗
i = θid logQ− ψ
N∑
j=1
θi,jd
[
log pj/P˜
]
(3.5)
with i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. From appendix B, d logQ can be also expressed as:
d logQ = γd logZ
which indicates that the total input decision is γ proportional to the total output decision.
Following the notation adopted in the previous section, equation (3.5) should be written
as
hijd log q
∗
ij = θijd logQ− ψ
N∑
s=1
θij,sd
[
log ps/P˜
]
with s, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. In this case, the consistency of model (3.5) with the definition
of Hicksian demand function for the multi-product industry, qhij = qij (pi, Qi(w,P)) is
easily verified. For notational easiness we will maintain the indexing used in equation
(3.5) where i, j = ij ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Model (3.5) requires that the following parametric restrictions are met in order to satisfy
the theoretical demand properties of homogeneity and symmetry, respectively:
N∑
j=1
θij = 0
θij = θji
Moreover, conditional input prices and divisia index elasticities (hereafter ”divisia
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elasticities”) can be specified as:
εqipj =
∂ log q∗i
∂ log pj
= −ψ(Θij − θiθj)h−1i = θijh−1i
ηqiQ =
∂ log q∗i
∂ logQ
= θih
−1
i
where, from appendix B, Θij ∈ Θ and θi, θij ∈ θ. More explicitly, εqipj measures the
impact of input j’s price on the conditional demand for input i (holding constant or, in
other words, conditional to the total input decision Q) and ηqiQ captures how a change
in the total input decision affects the conditional demand for input i.
Following Washington and Kilmer (2002b,a); Christou et al. (2005); Muhammad and
Kilmer (2008), the model presented in this section is adopted to describe the input
allocation decision of country i as a function of other countries’ relative prices and the
input Divisia index for soybeans and maize. Under the assumption that soybeans and
maize are exclusively imported through international trading companies, then it is very
likely that downstream enterprises will purchase the same product without any further
transformation; if this is the case, the proportionality factor γ = 1 and d logQ = d logZ.
What international traders may convey with soybeans and maize is a set of services
which typically consists of storage, logistics, transportation, risk management, initial
procurement and so on. Therefore, the output of these upstream firms (in volume) will
equal the total quantity of the imported product (Q). Moreover, under (industry) profit
aggregation and given prices, q∗i =
∑G
g=1 q
∗
ig for all g ∈ {1, . . . , G}, where q∗ig is the optimal
quantity for the gth international trader.
Econometric specification
Consistently with Washington and Kilmer (2002b,a); Muhammad and Kilmer (2008);
Christou et al. (2005), model (3.5) shall be properly specified for econometric estimation.
Differential terms are thereby expressed in terms of finite log changes and the time
component is also embedded in expression (3.5). The resulting system of demand
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equations can be written as:
h¯it∆qit = θi∆Qt +
N∑
j=1
pii,j∆pjt + εit (3.6)
where h¯it = (hit + hit−1) /2, hit = Vit/
∑N
j=1 Vjt with Vit being import from country i,
∆qit = log qit − log qit−1 with qit being the quantity imported from county i, ∆Qt =
Qt − Qt−1, Qt =
∑N
i=1 h¯it∆qit, ∆pjt = log pjt − log pjt−1 with pjt being the import price
for soybean imported from country j.
Estimated conditional elasticities εˆqipj and ηˆqiQ are typically computed at the mean values
of hit: h˙i =
∑T
t=1 hit/T , for all i. Elasticities’ standard errors are computed as follows:
s.e.
(
εˆqipj
)
=
s.e. (pii,j)
h˙i
s.e. (ηˆqiQ) =
s.e. (θi)
h˙i
3.3 Data and estimation
The data we use to estimate model (3.6) are quarterly time series from 1999 to 2014 in
the case of soybeans and from 2001 to 2014 for maize. We decided to employ two different
timespan because data regarding maize imports from Brazil are incomplete throughout
1999 and 2000. All data employed to estimate model (3.6) are provided by the Eurostat’s
trade statistics dataset (Eurostat, 2015). Imported quantities and import values from each
source are expressed in 100 Kg and Euro, respectively. Prices are artificially computed
dividing the value of soybeans or maize imported from county j by the quantity (these
prices are called ”unit values” and are extensively used in trade analysis (Washington
and Kilmer, 2002b,a; Muhammad and Kilmer, 2008)). The sources we consider in the
present analysis are United States, Brazil, Canada and Paraguay for soybean grains and
Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine and United States for maize. Summary statistics are presented
in table 3.7.
Before proceeding with the estimation of model (3.6), we investigated the stationarity of
∆Qt, h¯it∆qit and ∆pit for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N} using a seasonally-corrected Augmented
55
Tab. 3.7: Summary statistics.
USA Brazil Canada Paraguay Ukraine Argentina
Soybeans
Import Price (e/100Kg) Mean 29.9 28.7 31.9 28.5 - -
Max 69.9 53.1 62.2 51.8 - -
Min 18 17.7 19.5 16.9 - -
S.D. 10 9 8.9 9.1 - -
Quantity (mmt) Mean 1.05 1.95 0.16 0.29 - -
Max 4.3 4.3 0.85 0.96 - -
Min 0.006 0.16 0.007 0.004 - -
S.D. 1.1 1.11 0.18 0.24 - -
Maize
Import Price (e/100Kg) Mean 37.3 18.54 - - 15.72 19.0
Max 91.0 49.6 - - 23.8 31.26
Min 13.52 10.8 - - 7.9 10.35
S.D. 19.6 7.7 - - 4.5 6.2
Quantity (mmt) Mean 0.05 0.43 - - 0.49 0.32
Max 0.05 4.2 - - 4.4 2.1
Min 0.0028 0.00003 - - 0.00013 0.29
S.D. 0.11 0.65 - - 0.87 0.37
Divisia Index Soybeans Mean Max Min Std.dev.
0.116 0.815 -0.443 0.217
Divisia Index Maize Mean Max Min Std.dev.
0.010 0.950 -0.770 0.337
Source: own-elaboration based on based on Eurostat (2015) data
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Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Said and Dickey, 1984) proposed by da Silva Lopes (2006).
Although Wang and Tomek (2007) did not find any significant difference in ADF tests
results with or without using seasonal dummies in the reference DF regression, the
inclusion of deterministic seasonality in DF tests (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) is justified
by the fact that, when the data generating process (DGP) contains seasonal unit roots,
the test regression must at least include all the deterministic components of the DGP itself
(da Silva Lopes, 2006). In other words, test results are conditional on the specification of
the right-hand side of the reference DF equation8 (Wang and Tomek, 2007). We test the
presence of unit roots in each time series using the following nested specification of the
classical ADF equation:
∆yt =
4∑
i=1
γiDit + γt+ φyt−1 +
qmax∑
q=1
ξq∆yt−q + t (3.7)
where yt is the time series of interest, t is a linear time trend,
∑4
i=1Dit indicates a set
of quarterly dummies (i.e. D1t = 1 if t = {January −March} and 0 otherwise) and t
represents a weakly stationary invertible ARMA(p, q) process in the innovation sequence
defined as {t} ∼ iid(0, σ2). We selected the lag truncation parameter qmax comparing the
results given by Schwert (1989) ”rule of thumb” criteria9 and the ”t-sig 5%” procedure
proposed by Ng and Perron (2001) and others. The maximum number of lags is set to 410
but the value is adjusted equation by equation using the ”t-sig 5%” criteria. Estimated
test statistics for the autoregressive parameter in model (3.7) are reported in tables 3.8
and 3.9. As expected for variables in first differences, no evidences of unit root processes
were detected in either time series.
Model (3.6) is estimated through an autocorrelation-robust system IFGLS (Iterative
8It is also worth to remark that the inclusion of quarterly dummy variables in the ADF equation
with linear trend follows Ghysels et al. (1994) recommendation concerning tests for seasonal unit roots:
the authors argue that the inclusion of this new test of controls in the ADF equation is a conservative
strategy in applied econometrics when one has to test for either non-seasonal or seasonal unit roots.
9Schwert (1989) suggests a selection criteria based on the length of the times series: qmax =
int{4(T/100)1/4} or qmax = int{12(T/100)1/4}
10da Silva Lopes (2006) also suggests to use a ”seasonally modified” deterministic rule for choosing
qmax; in particular, for T ∈ [48, 80), the author advocates qmax = 4
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Tab. 3.8: Seasonally Augmented DF equations, OLS estimation results (Soybeans).
US Brazil Canada Paraguay
ADF test statistic
∆pit -5.350 -4.546 -4.450 -4.720
h¯it∆qit -4.352 -5.422 -4.739 -4.085
∆Qt -4.931
Critical values
1% T=60, qmax = 4 -4.32
5% T=60, qmax = 4 -3.60
10% T=60, qmax = 4 -3.24
Critical values provided by da Silva Lopes (2006).
Tab. 3.9: Seasonally Augmented DF equations, OLS estimation results (Maize).
Argentina Brazil Ukraine US
ADF test statistic
∆pit -3.931 -5.621 -3.688 -4.124
h¯it∆qit -4.881 -3.827 -4.552 -4.443
∆Qt -6.899
Critical values
1% T=64, qmax = 4 -4.32
5% T=64, qmax = 4 -3.60
10% T=64, qmax = 4 -3.24
Critical values provided by da Silva Lopes (2006).
58
Feasible Generalized Least Square), after imposing symmetry and homogeneity. This
procedure employs an iterated fit of the system variance-covariance matrix to achieve
efficiency (see Appendix C). As indicated by Kastens and Brester (1996) and Murphy et al.
(2004), the forecasting ability of demand systems improves when theoretical properties
are imposed rather then tested (even when rejected by appropriate testing procedures);
therefore, we estimate model (3.6) under the restrictions presented in section 3.2, namely:∑N
j=1 θij = 0 and θij = θji.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Soybean
With the exception of Paraguay, all soybeans Divisia and own-price parameters have the
expected sign (see table 3.10).
Tab. 3.10: Estimation results, soybeans.
Conditional own-price and cross-price coefficients
Div. Ind. US Brazil Canada Paraguay
US 0.4645*** -1.2467*** 1.3040*** -0.1846** 0.1274
(s.e.) (0.1304) (0.3714) (0.3180) (0.0780) (0.0890)
Brazil 0.0625 -1.5244*** 0.4540*** -0.2336**
(s.e.) (0.0992) (0.2981) (0.0855) (0.0956)
Canada 0.0843*** -0.3368*** 0.0674
(s.e.) (0.0225) (0.0877) (0.0535)
Paraguay -0.0213 0.0388
(s.e.) (0.0286) (0.0641)
Note: ∗∗∗ for 1%, ∗∗ for 5% and ∗ for 10%.
The Divisia index elasticities are significant only for the US and Canada and suggest
that if the total soybeans imported in the EU increases by 1%, the amount of soybeans
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these two countries do export to the EU will increase by approximately 1.5%. Therefore,
there is not a clear difference in terms of import benefit between the US and Canada.
On the other hand, the negative Divisia elasticity for Paraguay indicates that soybeans
from this source are considered inferior goods in the soybean supply chain (Washington
and Kilmer, 2002). Conditional own-price elasticities are all negative and significant
with the exception of Paraguay. Their absolute values are high, but in line with
those found by Wilson (1994) for wheat; in particular, Canada turns out to be the
most elastic soybean source followed by the US and Brazil. Paraguay is the only
exporter showing an exceptionally low (and positive) value but, again, this is not
statistically significant. The absolute magnitude of conditional own-price elasticities
imply that Canada is the most price responsive soybeans source, while Brazil is less
sensitive. Altogether, these large absolute values indicate that the European import
Tab. 3.11: Divisia and conditional price elasticities, soybeans.
Divisia, conditional own-price and cross-price elasticities
Divisia Cross-price
US Brazil Canada Paraguay
US 1.5880*** -4.2623*** 4.4581*** -0.6313** 0.4355
(s.e.) (0.4458) (1.2699) (1.087) (0.2668) (0.304)
Brazil 0.1148 2.3951*** -2.7999*** 0.8340*** -0.4291**
(s.e.) (0.1823) (0.5841) (0.5476) (0.1570) (0.1756)
Canada 1.5832 *** -3.4660** 8.5222*** -6.3215*** 1.2653
(s.e.) (0.4233) (1.4651) (1.6049) (1.6474) (1.0041)
Paraguay -0.2428 1.4480 -2.6555** 0.7662 0.4411
(s.e.) (0.3259) (1.0127) (1.0872) (0.6081) (0.7295)
Note: ∗∗∗ for 1%, ∗∗ for 5% and ∗ for 10%.
structure is particularly price sensitive. Conditional cross-price elasticities suggest a
complementarity relationship between Canada and the US, while Paraguay turns out
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to be a complement for Brazil. On the other hand, Brazil and Paraguay are substitutes
for the US and Canada respectively. Under the geographical heterogeneity hypothesis
(i.e. the Armington hypothesis) postulated in section 3.1, these results provide some
clear indications regarding European import dynamics. For example, Canada shares
a number of country-specific characteristics with the US, including most export routes
towards the EU (i.e.: distance), the extent (and range) of commercialized GM soybean
varieties (see table 3.4) and the perceived efficiency of handling infrastructures (see
tables 3.5 and 3.6). The same argument is true for Paraguay and Brazil, although the
similarities between these two countries are less trivial. Differently, South American
and North American soybeans show contrasting nutritional features: as we have already
discussed in section 3.1, US soybeans typically show higher crude protein and lysine
concentration levels, while Brazilian grains are usually less nutritious but substantially
cheaper (Karr-Lilienthal et al. (2004), Grieshop and Fahey (2001)). Moreover, Brazil and
the US are characterized by distinct supply chains and GMO policies: the mean value
of the Protectionism Index over the period 2000-2013 is 2.24 and 1.58 for the US and
Brazil, respectively, while the PIQ and AIQ indexes are systematically larger for North
American countries. These results indicate that conditional cross-price elasticities seem
to put less weight on substitution/complementarity based on soybeans’ country-specific
characteristics (nutritional features, GMOs and supply chain efficiency) and place more
emphasis on substitution/complementarity which might be dictated by seasonality or
pure price competition. We verify this hypothesis by estimating model (3.6) with the
inclusion of a set of quarterly dummy variables:
h¯it∆qit = θi∆Qt +
N∑
j=1
pii,j∆pjt +
4∑
s=1
Dst + εit (3.8)
Following Boonsaeng et al. (2008) the inclusion of fixed effects does not change the
properties of the DFAM. Estimated Divisa, own-price and cross-price coefficients for
model (3.8) are reported in table 3.12. The inclusion of quarterly dummies highlights
that much of the soybeans demand dynamics are significantly attributable to seasonality.
In fact, most of the estimated price parameters are no longer significant in equation (3.8),
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Tab. 3.12: Estimation results with quarterly dummies, soybeans.
Conditional own-price and cross-price coefficients
Div. Ind. US Brazil Canada Paraguay
US 0.4858*** -0.0743 0.2581 -0.1670** -0.01670
(s.e.) (0.0858) (0.1934) (0.1776) (0.0771) (0.0715)
Brazil 0.0873 -0.4978*** 0.3187*** -0.0790
(s.e.) (0.0596) (0.1972) (0.0936) (0.0832)
Canada 0.0719** -0.2215** 0.0698
(s.e.) (0.0261) (0.1014) (0.0610)
Paraguay -0.0478* 0.0259
(s.e.) (0.0260) (0.0674)
Quarter1 0.1322*** -0.0181 -0.0110 -0.0326***
(s.e.) (0.0308) (0.0214) (0.0095) (0.0094)
Quarter2 -0.3419*** 0.2544*** 0.0015 0.0527***
(s.e.) (0.0290) (0.0207) (0.0099) (0.0096)
Quarter3 0.0250 -0.0692*** 0.0064 -0.0005
(s.e.) (0.0277) (0.0191) (0.0083) (0.0083)
Quarter4 0.1990*** -0.1743*** 0.0211* -0.0171
(s.e.) (0.0348) (0.0252) (0.0124) (0.0113)
Note: ∗∗∗ for 1%, ∗∗ for 5% and ∗ for 10%.
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while the coefficients of the quarterly dummies reveal that much of the variability is due
to periodicity. In particualr, dummy variables show that the US export less soybeans
to the EU during the second quarter (April, May, June), when imports from Brazil and
Paraguay are the highest. This result indicates a clear seasonally-driven substitution
between the US and Brazil/Paraguay: since planting in North America typically begins
in mid April and lasts till June, imports from the US are lower and the product is
therefore substituted by grains originated from either Brazil or Paraguay (where soybean
is already being harvested and stored). Similarly, the availability of US’ soybeans during
the first, third and fourth quarter coincides with a reduction of the import from each
other country, with the exception of Canada. Last, during the October, November
and December quarter, soybean imports from North America are higher than imports
from South America (although the parameter associated with Canada is not statistically
significant), where soybean is typically being planted.
3.4.2 Maize
All maize Divisia and own-price parameters have the expected sign (see table 3.13).
Divisia, conditional own-price and cross-price elasticities for maize are reported in
table 3.14. The Divisia index elasticities suggest that a 1% increase in the EU maize
import drive Argentina’s, Brazil’s and Ukraine’s export up by 0.55%, 0.76% and 0.60%,
respectively. As expected, all conditional own-price elasticities are negative and significant
at 1%. On the other hand, conditional cross-price elasticities are quite different from
what we observed for soybeans; in fact, all maize sources seem to be one substitute
for each other, with the exception of the United States (although the complementary
between the US and Brazil is not statistically significant). Once again, this result
suggests that the imperfect substitution among different exporters does not follow any
clear pattern attributable to either nutritional characteristics, range of approved GMOs
and/or efficiency of supply chain management. As displayed in table 3.15, the inclusion
of quarterly dummy variables in model (3.6) does not trace out any seasonality in the
European maize import structure: demand parameters remain substantially unchanged
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Tab. 3.13: Estimation results, maize.
Conditional own-price and cross-price coefficients
Div. Ind. Argentina Brazil Ukraine US
Argentina 0.1024*** -0.4412*** 0.1583*** 0.1972** 0.0856**
(s.e.) (0.0180) (0.0961) (0.0538) (0.0823) (0.0339)
Brazil 0.0891*** -0.3333*** 0.1978*** -0.0227
(s.e.) (0.0209) (0.0692) (0.0595) (0.0260)
Ukraine 0.0647*** -0.4488*** 0.0537
(s.e.) (0.0185) (0.0993) (0.0359)
US -0.2623 -0.1165***
(s.e.) (0.0078) (0.0229)
Note: ∗∗∗ for 1%, ∗∗ for 5% and ∗ for 10%.
and significance is mostly unaffected. Only imports from Argentina seem to be quite
sensitive to the crop’s life cycle in south America, yet the negative sign in quarter 3 does
not coincide with either planting or harvesting periods. Therefore, Argentina, Brazil, US
and Ukraine most likely compete on price when it comes to commercialize maize on the
European market. Finally, all maize conditional cross-country and own-price elasticities
are smaller in absolute value than those we estimated for soybeans; this indicates that
the European import structure for maize is less price sensitive than for soybeans.
3.5 Concluding remarks
In this work, we assess the European soybeans and maize import allocation structure
using a producer-theory grounded demand system borrowed from the popular differential
approach to the firm theory proposed by Laitinen and Theil (1978). This particular
way of tackling derived demand analysis has several advantages over models (typically in
levels) derived from cost minimization: first, intermediate goods are not assumed to enter
consumers’ utility functions directly; second, when the panel consists of high-frequency
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Tab. 3.14: Divisia and conditional price elasticities, maize.
Divisia, conditional own-price and cross-price elasticities
Divisia Cross-price
Argentina Brazil Ukraine US
Argentina 0.5396*** -2.3250*** 0.8342*** 1.0395** 0.4512**
(s.e.) (0.0949) (0.5066) (0.2838) (0.4340) (0.1790)
Brazil 0.7923*** 1.4073*** -2.9633*** 1.7586*** -0.2026
(s.e.) (0.1858) (0.4788) (0.6153) (0.5297) (0.2317)
Ukraine 0.6173*** 1.8801** 1.8851*** -4.2776*** 0.5123
(s.e.) (0.1766) (0.7849) (0.5678) (0.7295) (0.3423)
US -0.2570 2.6105** -0.6950 1.6388 -3.5543***
(s.e.) (0.2395) (1.0360) (0.7956) (1.0951) (0.6996)
Note: ∗∗∗ for 1%, ∗∗ for 5% and ∗ for 10%.
time series observation, first differentiation helps to get rid of non-stationarity if
variables are integrated of order one; third, differential models are simple, general
in their theoretical derivation (Clements and Gao, 2015) and easy to estimate.
Conditional own-price and cross-price elasticities indicate that differences in supply chain
efficiency, discrepancies in GMOs approval and other export-specific sources of product
differentiation (i.e. nutritional characteristics) do not play a significant role in tracing out
import demand dynamics for either maize or soybeans. In particular, soybeans cross-price
elasticities do not highlight any complementarity between qualitatively different oilseeds
(i.e. North America with respect to South America) nor substitution between similar
products (i.e. US with respect to Canada and Brazil with respect to Paraguay).
On the contrary, countries which share similar product characteristics turn out to be
complements. In this regard, the inclusion of quarterly dummy variables in the structural
model suggests that the the European soybeans import structure is mainly determined by
seasonality. Moreover, own-price elasticities are particularly high, indicating a remarkable
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Tab. 3.15: Estimation results with quarterly dummies, maize.
Conditional own-price and cross-price coefficients
Div. Ind. Argentina Brazil Ukraine US
Argentina 0.1111*** -0.3287*** 0.0499 0.1731** 0.1056***
(s.e.) (0.0158) (0.0912) (0.0515) (0.0794) (0.0322)
Brazil 0.1080*** -0.1711** 0.1373** -0.0160
(s.e.) (0.0219) (0.0698) (0.0625) (0.0280)
Ukraine 0.0465** -0.3332*** 0.0227
(s.e.) (0.0187) (0.1008) (0.0366)
US -0.0030 -0.1122***
(s.e.) (0.0083) (0.0238)
Quarter1 0.0121 -0.0063 0.0329* 0.0021
(s.e.) (0.0164) (0.0225) (0.0188) (0.0084)
Quarter2 0.0633*** -0.0103 -0.0169 -0.0008
(s.e.) (0.0164) (0.0227) (0.0191) (0.0086)
Quarter3 -0.0401** 0.0843*** -0.0319 0.0042
(s.e.) (0.0169) (0.0233) (0.0199) (0.0089)
Quarter4 -0.0426*** -0.0214 0.0285 -0.0205**
(s.e.) (0.0163) (0.0225) (0.0194) (0.0087)
Note: ∗∗∗ for 1%, ∗∗ for 5% and ∗ for 10%.
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price sensitiveness of the European import structure. Similarly, own-price and cross-price
elasticities for maize reveal that all source are substitutes, and parameter’s estimates
do not change substantially after the inclusion of quarterly dummy variables in the
structural model. This most likely implies that countries compete on price when it
comes to export maize to the European Union. The fact that soybeans import is mainly
driven by seasonality, while maize trade dynamics seems based on pure price competition
reflects what we reported in section 3.1: since the EU is not self sufficient when it comes
to high-protein feed sources, product availability is the key feature that differentiates
North American soybens from South American soybeans. On the other hand, maize is
widely grown in the EU and, although imports increased over the last seven years, it
does not represent a limiting factor for the European livestock industry. Moreover, the
largest maize suppliers (Argentina, Brazil and Ukraine) show similar supply chain and
GMOs approval indicators and, if the hypothesis of price-competing countries is true,
also nutritional characteristics (for which we were not able to find any specific analysis)
should not differ too much.
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4. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF GMO POLICY ON US
SOYBEAN PRICES
4.1 Background and motivation
During the past fifteen years, soybean prices have exhibited large fluctuations which
accompanied a clear increasing that settled prices at twice the level registered at the
beginning of 2000 (see figure 4.2, box 1). In particular, soybean prices rose sharply in
early 2004 and fell steeply twelve months later. Then, prices suddenly hiked during the
first quarter 2008 and decreased quite rapidly on the second half of the same year, with
values remaining substantially higher than the levels recorded before the initial lift. Last,
soybean prices rose remarkably in mid 2011, soared in late 2012 and settled at twice
the 2000 price in late 2014, after plunging for several quarters. As already discussed in
chapter 3, soybean is currently the most important agricultural commodity traded on
the international market, both in terms of volume and value; therefore, disentangling
the factors contributing to its price setting mechanism and understanding how their
behaviour could affect market prices is crucial for undertaking policy decisions targeted
at preserving farmers’ income, food security and financial market stability. Based on the
literature, we recognize at least four main drivers that may have significantly influenced
soybean prices during the last decade: demand growth in emerging economies and, more
generally, demand growth at the global level; price of energy, in particular crude oil
prices; speculation on the financial markets; increased adoption of genetically modified
(GM) organisms by the most important international producers (i.e. United States, Brazil
and Argentina) (James, 2010).
Among the four drivers we consider in the present study, the amount of empirical and
theoretical contributions concerning the effects of the quick spreading of GM varieties
on soybean real market prices is rather scarce1. On the other hand, the stream of
literature tackling the effect of the biotech revolution on the economic and environmental
performances of the major agricultural commodities is quite extensive. For example,
Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (2000), show that the increased adoption of herbicide-tolerant
(HT) soybean2 led to small (but significant) increases in yields and significant decreases in
total herbicide use by US farmers. Similarly, Bullock and Nitsi (2001) report cost saving
for GM soybean adopters by switching from more expensive herbicides to the cheap and
user friendly glyphosate. According to the authors, there are four main sources of cost
saving: first, glyphosate itself is relatively inexpensive and effective on a wide range of
weeds; second, since glyphosate is easy to use, switching to GM soybean has several
advantages in terms of resources management; third, a wide introduction of glyphosate
resistant crops may lower other herbicides’ prices through substitution effects; fourth, the
introduction of GM may initially drive prices of conventional varieties down. However,
given the price premium charged for patented GM soybean, it is argued that much of the
cost saving is likely to be the consequence of a more efficient production program with
lower management costs and reduced risk. Although several studies show that that gain
in terms of profits is negligible when switching to HT soybean (Fernandez-Cornejo et al.,
2002), evidence shows that farmers have decided to go for the biotech alternative anyway:
data reported by the USDA show that the rate of adoption of genetically engineered
soybean reached nearly 97% of the total soybean planted in 2014 (USDA, NASS, 2015).
In this regard, Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (2002) corroborates Bullock and Nitsi (2001) and
Carpenter and Gianessi (1999) thesis suggesting that the reason for the success of GM
soybean could be indeed sought into the increased planting flexibility and simplicity of the
weed management. Given the above contributions, we hypothesize that the introduction
1To our knowledge, only Sobolevsky et al. (2005) provide evidence concerning the effect of the
adoption of GM soybean on real market prices.
2Note that the most widely adopted GM soybean in the United Sates is Monsanto’s Roundup-Ready
Soybean. This privately-patented genetically engineered crop is designed to be resistant to glyphosate,
a particularly cheap and easy to use broad-band action herbicide.
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(and the adoption) of biotech soyean has effectively enhanced the efficiency of US soybean
cultivation thereby damping production costs. Under the assumption of competitive
markets, we expect that the efficiency gain through the introduction of HT varieties will
translate into reduction of real soybean market prices.
The literature regarding the effect of oil prices on commodity markets is also rather
extensive. The primary relationship between these two economic dimensions is due to
energy being an input in agricultural production. However, with the increased adoption
of agricultural commodities in energy production during the past ten years, the linkage
between the two markets have now become much stronger due to demand-side dynamics.
In particular, soybean oil is largely employed in the production of biodiesel: according
to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2015), more than 4800 million litres
of biodiesel3 were produced in 2014, corresponding to a 246% increase with respect to
2009 (see table 4.1). As shown in table 4.2, the hike in biodiesel production had a great
impact on the demand for soybean oil: production nearly tripled during the six-year
period 2009-2014.
Tab. 4.1: US biodiesel production, sales and stocks (million of litres).
Production Sales B100 Sales B100 in blend B100 stock change
2009 1,953 961 1,059 (53)
2010 1,298 950 336 0
2011 3,694 2,426 1,283 8
2012 3,668 2,850 919 68
2013 5,144 3,565 1,642 (41)
2014 4,807 2,998 1,858 (18)
Source: EIA (2015)
In this respect, Campiche et al. (2007) show empirically that soybean prices seem to be
3biodiesel can be either pure or blend; pure biodiesel is conventionally called B100, where 100 indicates
100% biodiesel. On the other hand, biodiesel blend contains both B100 and petroleum diesel fuel.
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Tab. 4.2: US biodiesel feedstock inputs (million of pounds). Unavailable data (NA) are
withheld to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
Canola Oil Corn Oil Cottonseed Oil Palm Oil Soybean Oil
2009 NA 84 NA NA 1,977
2010 246 112 NA NA 1,141
2011 847 304 NA NA 4,153
2012 787 571 NA NA 4,023
2013 646 1,068 NA 632 5,507
2014 1,046 970 NA 63 4,802
Source: EIA (2015)
more correlated to crude oil prices than to corn prices, thanks to the biodiesel market.
However, Harri et al. (2009), found no cointegration relationship between the market
price of soybean and the price of crude oil from 2006 to 20084. Similarly, Yu et al. (2006)
concluded that the influence of crude oil price shocks on the variation in vegetable oil
prices is relatively small.
The effect of speculation and investors’ behaviour on agricultural commodity prices has
been long discussed since the remarkable hike in commodity futures prices observed from
2005 to 2008, which followed a period of intense speculative activity primarily driven by
index funds (McPhail et al., 2012). Although the legislator and the competent authority
(the Commodity and Futures Trading Commission) took initiative to damp speculation
through the limitation of non-hedging positions, empirical studies reached no consensus on
whether the activity of index funds on futures markets did play any role on the dynamics
of commodity prices. In particular, the comprehensive meta-analysis presented by Irwin
and Sanders (2011) supports the idea that most investments in long-only commodity
index funds did not seem to overwhelm the normal functioning of these markets, so the
hike in commodity prices during the three-year period 2005-2008 was probably the result
4they restricted their dataset to the period since April 2006 because that was the earliest period
when a cointegrating relation between corn and crude oil was found
72
of mixed market conditions such as demand growth from China and other developing
economies, biofuel policies, monetary policy, trade restrictions or supply shortfalls. The
argument by which the demand surge in emerging markets such as China and other
developing countries has positively contributed to high agricultural commodity prices is
probably put forward assuming that the presence of global supply constraints limited
the easiness of production responses. In this regard, the sensitiveness of agricultural
commodity prices to international demand, supply and stocks might look straightforward
from an economic point of view: higher levels of income should result in a more inelastic
demand and prices of agricultural commodities more responsive to shifts in the supply
curve. At the same time, under constrained supply conditions, a right shift in global
demand would likewise drive commodity prices up more than proportionally. Although
some authors argue that demand growth and income rise in developing countries are
probably not responsible for agricultural prices escalation in recent years, this is not the
case for soybean. For example, Carter et al. (2009) suggest that, whereas China remained
a net exporter of corn, rice and wheat during the price spike period 2005-2008, the country
did experience a rapid growth in soybean import. However, recent data show that the
trade balance for wheat, rice, maize and soybean in China has turned negative even
for those product whose export exceeded import in the four-year period 2005-2008 (see
figure 4.1). This turnaround has been accompanied by a new sudden rise in agricultural
commodity prices. These new pieces of information are currently unexploited and might
provide a significant contribution in disentangling the effect of growing demand on the
market price of agricultural products. Nevertheless, when the aim is to assess the role
of demand-side dynamics on the price setting mechanism of agricultural commodities,
one should also account for demand fluctuations in developed countries. Therefore, our
analysis will employ a proxy for the global demand of agricultural commodities.
4.2 Methodology
We disentangle empirically the relative importance of global demand, price of energy,
speculation and rate of adoption of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in explaining
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Fig. 4.1: Chinese agricultural commodities trade balance index (base 2005).
Source: UN Trade Statistics (2015).
the US Soybean price dynamics through a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR)
model. Although these models have been important tools for analysing macroeconomic
(monetary, fiscal, technological, etc.) shocks (Enders, 2004), the dynamic nature of
agricultural commodity prices makes the SVAR methodology particularly suited for this
kind of analysis. Indeed, the empirical literature addressing the impact of policy/market
shocks on agricultural commodity prices though structural time series models have been
rapidly growing over the last few years; these contributions include McPhail et al. (2012),
McPhail and Babcock (2012), McPhail (2011), Mutuc et al. (2010), and Hausman et al.
(2012).
The general structure of a standard SVAR is provided in Appendix D. SVAR models are
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typically preferred to VARs (Vector Autoregression) because the latter are nothing more
than reduced form equations whose parameters are hardly interpreted without any clear
link to an underlying economic model. By turning to SVAR, some economic structure is
imposed by specifying contemporaneous movements in the set of selected variables; this
allows to identify structural parameters and break down times series into economically
meaningful shocks.
In our application, we define a 5-dimensional SVAR model (K = 5) that jointly explains
the dynamics of the crude oil price (OILt), Baltic Dry Index (BDIt), US soybean prices
(Pt), Working (1960) speculative index (SPECt) and the rate of adoption of genetically
modified soybean (ROAt). Following McPhail et al. (2012), Trostle (2010) and Kilian
(2006) the BDI is used as a proxy for the global demand of soybean. Since the BDI
charter rates for shipping dry bulks such as grains, coal, steel and others, it can be
interpreted as the equilibrium price of shipping raw materials throughout the globe.
Given that the supply function of maritime transportation services is typically inelastic
in the mid and short run, fluctuations in BDI are supposed to be largely explained by
changes in the global demand for dry bulks (Kilian, 2006). Despite its popularity in the
empirical literature, however, BDI is mainly adopted consequently to the limited (if any)
availability of data for dry bulk and, in our specific case, for world soybean demand.
The crude oil price is used to capture the effect of energy price shocks in the supply
chain of soybean: high crude oil prices will inflate farmers’ and processors’ operative
costs by boosting the expenditure in pesticides, fertilizers, fuel and transportation. Next,
the Working (1960) speculative index is used to approximate speculation activity in the
soybean futures market; in the present context, speculation indicates the investment in
commodity futures for non-commercial (non-hedging) purposes (i.e. financial profits)
through index funds and other financial instruments (McPhail et al., 2012). The index
measures how much speculation exceeds the minimum level needed to offset commercial
positions. Specifically, it is defined as the ratio of long and short speculative (non-hedging)
position to the global amount of long and short hedging positions. In particular, let
SS/SL indicate the speculative short/long positions and let HS/HL be the hedging
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short/long positions; then the Working (1960) speculative index can be defined as:
T = 1 +
SS
HS +HL
if HS > HL
T = 1 +
SL
HS +HL
if HS < HL
If all position on the futures market are either hedging or speculative, then HS + SS =
HL + SL meaning that long and short positions offset each other. If this is not the
case, speculation becomes necessary to take in the residual commercial positions. In the
extreme case that HS = 0, the minimum level of speculation needed in the futures market
is HL; if so, SL = 0 and T = 1. Lest, we measure the rate of adoption of GM soybean in
the United States through the ratio between the amount of GM soybean planted in each
marketing year and the whole amount of soybean cultivated during the same marketing
year.
Before proceeding with the estimation of impulse response functions, we tested each time
series for the presence of unit root processes. Using the seasonally-augmented ADF test
presented in the previous chapter, we found that all but one (the Working’s speculation
index) variables did contain a unit root (see table 4.3). Order one integration (hereafter
I(1)) was also verified by taking first differences of each non-stationary times series
and repeating the same ADF test on transformed data. As reported in Table 4.3, all
transformed variables are stationary hence all components of the random vector yt are
either I(1) or I(0). In this case, a natural way to proceed is to check if there exist any long
run relationship between the I(1) series. In other words, we want to test whether any of
the I(1) time series are cointegrated and how many cointegration relationships there are.
We used the popular Johansen (1995) likelihood ratio approach to test the identifying
long run restriction imposed on the cointegrating vectors. Since most series have trending
and seasonal behaviour, both a linear trend and a set of quarterly dummy variables were
included in the VAR specification employed for the testing procedure. Next, the lag order
of the VAR was selected using the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), assuming that the
farthest lag should not be larger than 45. We selected one lag and used both the ”trace”
5We decided to set the highest lag order to 4 based on data frequency and Schwert (1989) criteria.
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Tab. 4.3: Seasonally Augmented DF equations, OLS estimation results.
ADF test statistic
BDIt -2.175
OILt -2.467
SPECt -3.595
ROAt -2.925
Pt -2.825
Critical values
1% T=60, qmax = 4 -4.32
5% T=60, qmax = 4 -3.60
10% T=60, qmax = 4 -3.24
ADF test statistic
∆BDIt -5.498
∆OILt -5.763
∆ROAt -3.846
∆Pt -5.999
Critical values
1% T=60, qmax = 4 -4.32
5% T=60, qmax = 4 -3.60
10% T=60, qmax = 4 -3.24
Critical values provided by da Silva Lopes (2006).
and the ”max-eigenvalue” test; furthermore, we introduced a dummy variable to control
for the introduction of the 2005 Energy Policy Act, which introduced mandatory blending
for fossil fuels. Results are reported in table 4.4 and table 4.5 both tests suggest that
there are no long-run relationships in our set of time series. This result is consistent
with Harri et al. (2009) and Yu et al. (2006), who found no cointegration relationship
between soybean market prices and crude oil prices (these two variables were the most
likely candidates to show a long-run joint behaviour).
Tab. 4.4: Johansen (1995) ”trace” test, results.
H0 H1 Test statistic Critical values
10% 5% 1%
r ≤ 3 r = 4 3.68 10.49 12.25 16.26
r ≤ 2 r = 3 14.32 22.76 25.32 30.45
r ≤ 1 r = 2 31.06 39.06 42.44 48.45
r = 0 r = 1 60.70 59.14 62.99 70.05
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Tab. 4.5: Johansen (1995) ”max-eigenvalue” test, results.
H0 H1 Test statistic Critical values
10% 5% 1%
r ≤ 3 r = 4 3.68 10.49 12.25 16.26
r ≤ 2 r = 3 10.64 16.85 18.96 23.65
r ≤ 1 r = 2 16.74 23.11 25.54 30.34
r = 0 r = 1 29.64 29.12 31.46 36.65
Following appendix D, we take first differences of I(1) variables in yt and leave the I(0)
series unchanged. For notational easiness we use ∆yt to indicate the new random vector
(∆BDIt,∆OILt, SPECt,∆ROAt,∆Pt). The SVAR representation is then:
Γ∆yt = A(L)∆yt + ϕBt + εt
= a+
p∑
i=1
Ai∆yt−i + ϕBt + εt
(4.1)
where the off-diagonal elements of Γ capture the contemporaneous interactions across
variables, p is the lag order, Ai captures the lagged effects of the endogenous variables,
Bt is a dummy variable controlling for the introduction of the 2005 Energy Policy Act
and εt is the vector of structural innovations with variance-covariance matrix Σε = IK .
Our assumption is that soybean prices are driven by shocks in global demand (εBDIt ), oil
prices (εOILt ), speculation demand (ε
SPEC
t ) and rate of adoption of genetically modified
organisms (εROAt ); on the other hand, soybean market shocks (ε
P
t ) include all other shocks
affecting soybean prices which are not captured by the first four innovation terms.
The reduced-from VAR representation of model (4.1) is the following:
∆yt = Γ
−1a+
p∑
i=1
Γ−1Ai∆yt−i + Γ
−1ϕBt + Γ−1εt
= a∗ +
p∑
i=1
A∗i∆yt−i + ϕ
∗Bt + et
(4.2)
In order to identify structural parameters, proper theoretical exclusion restrictions shall
be placed on Γ−1; since ∆yt has dimension 5 × 1, we need to set 5(5 − 1)/2 = 10
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entries of Γ−1 to zero. For simplicity, we adopt the so-called ”triangular identification”
(Rubio-Ramirez et al., 2010) strategy to impose restrictions on Γ−1. These restrictions
are chosen on the grounds of economic intuition. First of all, we assume that the global
demand does not respond to a contemporaneous shock in crude oil price, speculation,
rate of adoption of GMOs or soybean market price. Second, the price of crude oil is
assumed to be not responding to a shock in speculation, rate of adoption of GMOs
and price of soybean within the same quarter; however, oil prices may be sensible to
shocks in global demand during the same quarter. These exclusion restrictions are quite
straightforward: in fact, it is hard to think of global demand and oil prices readily
responding to contemporaneous shocks in US-specific shocks like εSPECt , ε
ROA
t and ε
P
t .
Next, we hypothesize that speculation does not react to a contemporaneous shock in the
rate of adoption of GMOs or soybean market price, while the rate of adoption of GMOs
is assumed to be not responding to shock in soybean real prices during the same quarter.
We chose to restrict the contemporaneous relationship between eROAt and ε
P
t under the
assumption that farmers’ decision to switch to GM soybean cannot be instantaneous:
indeed, if conventional soybean was already being planted, farmers will have to wait the
following growing season to revise their planting decisions. On the other hand, whereas
the exclusion of εROAt from e
SPEC
t is obvious, the restriction of the γ35 parameter is
more problematic: although McPhail et al. (2012) excludes the same parameter in a
rather similar framework, their decision is actually less debatable because of the monthly
frequency of the data. However, since triangularization of Γ−1 is needed to identify
system (4.1), we set γ35 = 0 anyway and assume that speculation activity does not
respond to a contemporaneous shock in real soybean market prices. These restrictions
can be represented using the following matrix notation:
Γ−1 =

γ11 0 0 0 0
γ21 γ22 0 0 0
γ31 γ32 γ33 0 0
γ41 γ42 γ43 γ44 0
γ51 γ52 γ53 γ54 γ55

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hence
et =

eBDIt
eOILt
eSPECt
eROAt
ePt

=

γ11 0 0 0 0
γ21 γ22 0 0 0
γ31 γ32 γ33 0 0
γ41 γ42 γ43 γ44 0
γ51 γ52 γ53 γ54 γ55

×

εBDIt
εOILt
εSPECt
εROAt
εPt

4.3 Data
We employed quarterly time series from 2000 to 2014 to estimate impulse response
functions and perform variance decomposition; figure 4.2 shows data plots of each variable
employed in model (4.1) against time. US soybean prices (Pt) are ”Soyabeans, No.1
Yellow” prices provided by USDA expressed in dollar cents per bushel. USDA also
provides data regarding the rate of adoption of genetically modified soybean in the US
(ROAt): this share is computed as the ratio between the arable land cultivated with
biotech soybean and the global area dedicated to soybean planting (USDA, NASS, 2015).
BDIt is provided by The Baltic Exchange using US dollars as the reference currency.
Both US soybean prices and the BDI were retrieved from Datastream (Reuters, 2015).
The price of crude oil is expressed in US dollars and is made available by the World
Bank’s Global Economic Monitor (World Bank, 2015). Last, the amount of hedging and
speculating positions in the soybean futures market at Chicago Board of Trade is provided
by the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) through the Historical
Commitments of Trades reports (CFTC, 2015). Quarterly observations concerning the
rate of adoption of biotech soybean in the US deserve to be discussed in more details. Since
USDA provides tables with annual frequency only6, we used a cubic spline interpolation
for disaggregating annual data to quarterly time series in order to achieve the same
frequency in all variables (Pollock et al., 1999). Data plots before and after disaggregation
are shown in figure 4.3. We also created rather simple price indexes for BDI, crude oil
price and US soybeans price by normalizing each time series using the t = 1 observation
6This is natural because these observations are based on yearly planting decisions.
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Fig. 4.2: Data plots for the components of the random vector yt.
Sources indicated in the text.
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Fig. 4.3: Rate of adoption of GM soybean before and after cubic spline interpolation.
Source: USDA, NASS (2015)
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as numeraire.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Impulse response analysis
We use impulse response analysis to assess the response of real soybean prices to shocks
in global demand, crude oil prices, speculation and rate of adoption of GM soybean.
Figure 4.4 depicts the dynamic response of soybean market prices from shock to quarter
10 with the corresponding 95% bootstrap confidence intervals (dotted lines). Responses
of the dependent variable are obtained by considering one standard deviation shocks.
As expected, a rise in global demand translates into an immediate, sharp and positive
reaction of soybean market prices; this hike in soybean prices decreases rapidly during
the first two quarters and begins to fade out gradually from the third quarter. What we
observe implies that the supply-side response to a global demand shock would take at
least six months to bring soybean prices back to the initial level. A similar pattern is
recognized with a standard deviation shock in crude oil prices; however, in this case the
initial response is less strong and the effect dies out less gradually. The interpretation is
quite obvious: a rise in crude oil prices leads to higher transportation and energy costs,
thereby making the soybean production process more expensive. Moreover, high crude
oil prices might also drive the demand for biodiesel up thereby boosting the adoption of
soybean by the oil industry. Globally, impulse response analysis shows that shocks in
global demand and crude oil prices exert only temporary effects on soybean real prices.
On the other hand, the impulse response of soybean market prices to a shock in Working
(1960) speculation index is more subtle to interpret; however, our result is consistent (at
least initially) with that observed by McPhail et al. (2012) for maize. One standard
deviation shock in speculation generates an immediate negative response in soybean
market prices, but the effect is reversed in the next two quarters and starts to decrease less
steeply throughout the following four quarters. This result indicates that an hypothetical
inflationary effect of speculation on soybean real prices, if any, is at least delayed by two
83
Fig. 4.4: Soybean market price impulse responses to each shock.
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quarters. However, this effect does not persist for more than six quarters, indicating
that the price reaction is a mid-term phenomenon. This corroborates the hypothesis put
forward by Irwin et al. (2009) and Irwin and Sanders (2011) regarding the non-persistence
of real price effects in periods of intense speculation on the futures market. A shock in the
rate of adoption of GM soybean has initially no effect on soybean market prices. However,
starting from quarter one, the effect becomes negative and persists for one additional
quarter, while, starting from the second quarter, the effect begins to vanish more or less
rapidly and eventually fades out after six quarters. Following Fernandez-Cornejo et al.
(2000), Bullock and Nitsi (2001) and Klu¨mper and Qaim (2014), depending on specific
pedoclimatic conditions and the degree of spontaneous weeds infestations, the adoption of
biotech soybean (mostly Monstanto’s Roundup Ready soybean) leads, on the one hand,
to a reduction of the operative/managerial costs and, on the other hand, it marginally
increases yields. Therefore, the direction of the initial response is not surprising and might
well indicate that a wider cultivation of GM soybean has allowed ”GM farmers” to take
advantage of reduced operative and managerial costs; furthermore, ”conventional farmers”
might have also taken advantage from a reduction in other herbicides and conventional
seeds costs. However, the speed at which prices regress to the pre-shock levels might also
suggest that the market effect of biotech soybean on substitute seeds and herbicides might
exceed the cost saving for ”GM farmers”. In fact, although the shock in rate of adoption
turns out to be the most persisting one, it still vanishes after only four-six quarters.
4.4.2 Variance decomposition
The procedure we follow to decompose the forecast error variance is discussed in Appendix
D. Variance decomposition allows to measure the relative importance of each shock in
explaining the fluctuation in soybean market prices. Table 4.6 shows the percentage of the
variance of the error made in forecasting soybean prices attributable to a specific shock
in global demand, crude oil prices, speculation and rate of adoption of GM soybean.
These estimates are computed using historical averages for the whole time series since
2000 and, in general, the share of variance ascribable to different shocks differs from one
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t observation to another. Results show that, within a quarter, more than 71% of the
variability in soybean real prices is due to shocks which are not taken into consideration
by model (4.1). Moreover, global demand shocks explain nearly 23% of the soybean price
variation within a trimester, while oil shocks and speculation shocks represents roughly
the 3% and 2% of the variability in soybean real prices, respectively. In addition, Table
Tab. 4.6: Forecast error variance decomposition: percentage contribution of each shock to the
variability in soybean market prices.
Shocks
Quarter(s) Global demand Oil price Speculation Rate of Adoption Others
1 23.16 3.09 2.33 0.00 71.39
2 22.50 3.00 3.20 1.85 69.43
3 22.30 2.97 3.60 1.84 69.26
4 22.29 2.97 3.64 1.88 69.20
10 22.22 2.97 3.64 1.89 69.20
60 22.22 2.97 3.64 1.89 69.20
4.6 indicates that the rate of adoption of GM soybean does not exert any significant
effect on soybean real prices within one quarter. At six months, the contribution of the
five shocks to the variability of soybean market prices remains substantially unchanged;
the only noticeable difference lies in the rate of adoption of GM soybean. Although
it remains quite small, the rate of adoption begins to significantly contribute to real
prices variability in a two-quarters time horizon. This is consistent with the impulse
repose analysis because the price effect related to the adoption of biotech soybean is not
immediate. An increase in arable land dedicated to GM soybean requires at least six
months to exert any damping effect on real market prices. From that moment onward,
the relative contribution of each shock to soybean real price variation does not change any
more. This indicates no clear cut between short-term and long-term effects of structural
shocks on market price variance.
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4.5 Concluding remarks
In this work, we measure the relative importance and the impact of global demand,
energy prices, speculation and rate of adoption of genetically modified soybean on US
soybean real prices. While there are many studies assessing the dynamics of agricultural
commodity prices and their main determinants, most of the empirical evidence is
presented using time series techniques which treat variables in isolation. Besides, most of
the available research has focused on maize and, in particular, on the relationship between
real prices, energy and ethanol using either univariate or multivariate time series models.
Our aim was to model all contributing factors simultaneously through a structural vector
autoregression (SVAR). Consistently with Sobolevsky et al. (2005), impulse response
analysis indicate that a wider adoption of GM soybean leads to a decrease in soybean
real prices. Following the available literature, this might reflect either a significant
reduction of production costs (especially in terms of managerial costs), an increase in
yields (Klu¨mper and Qaim, 2014) or a substitution effect with conventional cultivation
techniques. Although Bullock and Nitsi (2001) and Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (2002) argue
that switching to GM soybean does not necessarily sort a positive effect on farmers’ profits,
our results suggest that, in the short run, the cost saving for ”GM-farmers” should be
initially larger than the profits’ reduction due to the new (lower) equilibrium price7.
Our findings are consistent with Klu¨mper and Qaim (2014): albeit the authors indicate
that switching to HT soybean leads to a substantial, yet not (statistically) significant
hike in farmers’ profits, they also show that, in general, the adoption of GM varieties
produces enough economic benefits to at least balance out patented seeds’ higher prices.
Similar results are presented by Finger et al. (2011). In the mid/long-run, however, lower
production costs (or higher profits) become attractive to conventional farmers that might
choose to adopt the biotech program. In this case, the market equilibria would gradually
reverse to the initial status, thereby bringing prices and profits back to the competitive
7Of course, this hypothesis requires the initial assumption of competitive markets with zero profits
for conventional farmers.
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level. This is what we observe from the second quarter of our impulse response function.
In principle, however, the right tail of the impulse response function should have been
less steep, indicating a smoother recovery of the initial equilibrium. In addition, variance
decomposition shows that the impact of biotechnology adoption on soybean price variation
over the period 2000-2014 is negligible in the very short run and remains low in the
mid-long term. Another curious result is linked to the impulse response of soybean real
prices to a shock in speculation: whereas the immediate reaction is negative, intense
speculation drives market prices up after two quarters. Last, the shocks in oil prices
and global demand exert an expected positive effects on soybean real prices, but the
percentage contribution of an energy price shock to the variability in soybean market
prices is limited. Moreover, the two positive effects are both short lived.
This work is certainly not free from critical issues. First of all, although the time series
we employ to estimate our model should be long enough to achieve consistency, having
too many years typically increases the risk of including structural breaks. In this regard,
we control for the introduction of the 2005 Energy Policy Act but we fail to consider
other major breaks such as the explosion of the ongoing economic crisis. Another major
limitation lies in data frequency: on the one hand, quarterly observations are often
not disaggregated enough to properly model short-term price dynamics while, on the
other hand, the annual frequency of GM adoption data is hardly compatible with the
other series. In particular, the inconsistency between annual and quarterly observations
is particularly critical when it comes to lag selection. For this reason, we decided to
disaggregate annual data using a cubic spline approximation, even though this procedure
reduces the problem only marginally.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
5.1 General conclusions
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the role of GM and non-GM products on
soybean and maize import, demand and prices in the EU. In particular, given the
unavailability of reliable trade data for non-GM agricultural products, we assess how
the governance of agricultural supply chains is framed under product segregation in
order to cope with environmental and quality uncertainty. Using information gathered
through vis-a’-vis questionnaires, we develop a case study for the most important non-GM
commodity in the Italian (and European) feed industry: soybean meal. Since the
literature indicates that the upstream product management is typically more problematic,
we focus on the relationship between overseas soybean crushers and international trading
companies. Conclusions are drawn based on the conceptual framework provided by
Williamson (1991) and Me´nard’s (2004) theory of hybrid organizations. Whereas
environmental uncertainty would require looser governance forms, quality uncertainty
is better managed under vertical integration; since the management of non-GM
soybean meal requires strong quality control mechanisms under non-trivial environmental
uncertainty, we find that the supply chain governance relies on highly formalized yearly
contracts. Although the structure of these contracts provides for strict operational
standards and process certification, the yearly frequency enables the supply chain to
adapt to uncertain market conditions. Moreover, we find that trust1 is an interesting
uncertainty control mechanism in the supply chain for non-GM soybean. The reason
1Trust is typically achieved through frequent transactions.
should be sought in: first, the high risk of adventitious presence2; second, the serious
probability of exceeding the lower bound for authorized GM events; third, the opportunity
for overseas exporters to stabilize price premiums and maintain a secure (niche) market
channel to the EU.
It is also important to remark that, while quality uncertainty is probably less problematic
because of its technical nature, understanding how environmental factors evolve is
certainly more difficult and so is anticipating how the supply chain governance may evolve.
Therefore, our findings are conditional on the availability on non-GM products, on the
price premium corresponded for non-GM products and on the changes in demand. In this
regard, the introduction of ”GM-free” labelling schemes by some EU MS might create
marketing opportunities for new overseas non-GM soybean producers. Obviously, the
price premium paid for the non-GM status must be proportional to segregation costs,
meaning that the adoption of ”GM-free” labels must be eventually accompanied by
consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for the ”extra quality”. As consumers’ WTP is
at present insufficient to fill the price gap between GM and non-GM soybean meal,
this price differential is pressuring some actors along the supply chain3. Therefore, if
consumers were not ready to pay the toll of segregation, a wider introduction of non-GM
products through the ”GM-free” labelling schemes might pose further price pressure on
the weakest actors of the chain.
The second result of our empirical analysis answers the question: ”is the
substitution/complementarity among overseas maize and soybeans exporters (to the
EU) dictated by source-specific product characteristics4?”. The estimated EU demand
elasticities for maize and soybeans suggest that the answer is ”no”. In particular,
soybeans cross-price elasticities highlight that countries with similar characteristics are
2Adventitious presence occurs when trace amounts of an agricultural biotech product that has not
been approved for commercial use by any competent government authority, but is found in the commercial
crop or food supply despite best agricultural and manufacturing practices.
3Most likely livestock breeders.
4These characteristics are: nutritional features, product management efficiency and asynchronous
approval.
90
complements, while there is substitution between countries with different supply chain
efficiency, approved GMOs and product’s nutritional features. This result indicates that
soybeans import demand must be regulated by other source-specific attributes; intuitively,
the fact that complementarity is detected between US/Canada and Brazil/Paraguay while
substitution is found between North American and South American countries5 suggests
that seasonality might play an important role on EU import decision. Using seasonal
dummy variables, we are able to supports this hypothesis. In view of the negative EU
trade balance for soybean and the importance of this product to the EU poultry and hog
industry, the outcome is not surprising. For the opposite reason, seasonality should not
be that important for maize and, in fact, estimated parameters for maize demand show
that the inclusion of quarterly dummies does not trace out any periodicity in EU maize
imports. Moreover, cross-price elasticities reveal that all maize sources are substitutes
suggesting that, overall, Argentina, Brazil and Ukraine compete on price when it comes
to commercialize maize on the European market. Last, our empirical analysis emphasizes
that the debated issue of asynchronous approval does not play a crucial role on EU import
decisions; this is probably due, on the one hand, to the EU dependence on soybean import
and, on the other hand, to the substantial equivalence between the EU and Argentina,
Ukraine and Brazil in terms of authorized GM maize varieties. In addition, as de Faria
and Wieck (2015) suggest, the substantial synchronization between the EU and the major
soybean and maize exporting countries might have mitigated this issue during the last
fifteen years. Nevertheless, the structure of the EU import demand for soybean and
maize might not be invariant to the introduction of new GM varieties (i.e. the so-called
”second-generation” GMOs6). Since countries that have strong differences in their GM
regulations trade significantly less (de Faria and Wieck (2015), Vigani et al. (2012)), the
pure price competition we observe among overseas maize exporters might no longer be
true if some of these countries decide to introduce (and commercialize) new GM varieties.
5In other words, we find substitution between Brazil/US, Brazil/Canada, Paraguay/US and
Paraguay/Canada (see table 3.11).
6The second wave of genetic modification in agricultural crops focuses on output traits such as
improved nutritional features and processing characteristics (Stegelin et al., 2011)
91
That is, regulation asymmetries would ultimately undermine the substantial equivalence
between products originated from Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine or the US. As a consequence,
EU livestock breeders might be challenged with higher raw material prices unless the EU
approval process for newly released genetically engineered crops is fastened or domestic
production is boosted. On the other hand, as long as the gap between the EU soybean
demand and supply is filled through imports (Eurostat, 2015), seasonality will constantly
play a leading role in determining the EU import decision; in this case, the response to
the adoption of new GM varieties by overseas exporters will be mild.
In our last chapter, we use a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) to show that the
adoption of herbicide resistant (GM) soybean exerts a negative, yet short-lived, effect on
real soybean market prices. Following the literature, we conclude that the price reduction
follows the introduction of the GM soybean in a perfectly competitive market, where
only conventional soybean is initially cultivated. In the short-run, innovating farmers
(i.e. GMOs adopters) would earn positive profits due to lower production costs while,
in the mid/long-run, lower production costs would attract conventional farmers, thereby
bringing profits back to zero and the equilibrium price back to the initial level. However,
the effect of the innovation shock on soybean real prices does not persist for more than
few quarters, with a rather fast recovery of the pre-GM equilibrium. Moreover, this effect
of the GM innovation does not contribute much to the soybean price variability, meaning
that a spreading of biotech soybean has only a limited impact on market prices. As we
will discuss in the next section, however, the rapid vanishing of the price reduction might
be linked to the AIC-based lag selection mechanisms; if so, our result might be biased
and the true impulse response might be smoother.
5.2 Methodologies and data
The use of empirical research methods to properly analyse the international market of
non-GM agricultural products is seriously limited by the lack of reliable data on trade
flows and price premiums. Nevertheless, case studies may provide a useful tool for
understanding supply chain mechanisms as the analysis provided in chapter two. Given
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the narrow scope of our analysis (i.e. the supply chain on non-GM soybean in Italy),
the use of a case study allows for a detailed investigation of all economic agents involved
and, using transaction cost economics as theoretical framework, information gathered
through vis-a´-vis interviews can be effectively framed. As a result, conclusion are be
based on a firm economic ground. Nonetheless, case studies are often hardly replicable
and do not allow to quantitatively assess the effects of changing demand or supply
conditions. Also, vis-a´-vis interviews are extremely time consuming and most of the
times respondents do not provide all the expected information. In our opinion, however,
the use of targeted questionnaires, paired with the appropriate economic theory, remains
the most appropriate way to study niche markets, particularly when detailed secondary
source data are unavailable or too expensive to collect.
In chapter three, we presented the main advantages of modelling import demand using a
functional from derived from production theory (the so-called differential factor allocation
model, DFAM). Here we want to stress that, although the differences between this
approach and the modelling based on consumer theory might seem negligible from a
mathematical point of view, the conceptual implications are not trivial. In particular,
the use of production theory provides, first, a useful shortcut to avoid aggregation across
heterogeneous consumers and, second, a straightforward way to avoid intermediate goods
entering consumer’s utility functions directly. Moreover, using a demand system derived
from the differential approach to the firm theory, the specification of a cost/profit function
is no longer necessary to derive a ready-to-estimate functional form. From an empirical
point of view, models in (log) first differences have several advantages over demand
systems in levels, the most relevant being the invariance to order-one integrated data. In
other words, first differentiating has no conceptual implications on estimated parameters
because it derives from the logarithmic specification of the total differential. Moreover,
since these models are linear in the parameters, structural coefficients can be easily
estimated with using standard least squares technique; since our dataset consists of a
rather long time series of quarterly observations, we decided to include autocorrelation in
the standard variance-covariance matrix of the popular ISUR estimator. The data we used
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to estimate the empirical model deserve a separate discussion: although Eurostat provides
monthly observation regarding EU import statistics, prices are forcedly calculated as value
divided by volume7. Even though unit values are often used in trade analysis (Washington
and Kilmer, 2002b), Schott (2004) asserts that Free on Board (FOB) prices should be
used when analysing the trade of differentiated goods. Unfortunately, FOB prices were
not available for all exporters presented in chapter three, therefore we were forced to
proceed with the analysis using unit values.
When discussing the SVAR methodology employed in chapter four, it is worth dwelling
on two very important issues: first, the model identification through the so-called
”triangular identification” (Christiano et al., 1996); second, the lag choice. Identification
in SVAR models is typically achieved by imposing exclusion restrictions on the inverse
contemporaneous coefficients matrix and, indeed, this is what we did in our work.
Sometimes, however, this identification strategy may not be fully consistent with the
economic theory; in fact, some parameters might be restricted just for the sake of
obtaining a lower triangular matrix. For example, the restriction of the contemporaneous
coefficient between the reduced form speculation innovation and the structural price
innovation might be highly questionable when using quarterly data. Although we decided
to stick with the standard (and easier) triangular identification strategy and restrict
this parameter anyway, we might need to re-estimated the model using alternative
identification methods (such as non-triangular techniques (Rubio-Ramirez et al., 2010))
and compare the results. The second issue has to do with the lag choice in the structural
model. Consistently with most of the applied literature, we selected the lag truncation
parameter using the Schwert (1989) criteria; although this method is widely adopted in
empirical analysis, we believe that the use of the spline-interpolated rate of adoption
data might generate a lag selection problem. In fact, despite the quarterly frequency,
the structure of the time series has remained substantially unchanged and it might still
incorporate yearly fluctuations. In this case, Schwert (1989) criteria would give a different
result and identifying the correct number of lags in the structural model through AIC
7Values reported by Eurostat are Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF).
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would be rather demanding. Unfortunately, there is no clear solution to this problem
because the frequency of data regarding the cultivation of GM soybean is annual by
definition. One alternative way of extracting information from rate of adoption data
would consist of using yearly observations for all other variables; on the one hand, this
shortcut would probably solve the lag selection problem, on other hand, the price to pay
in terms of reduction of the sample size would be rather high.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A
Questionnaire to the experts of the market for compound feed products
Structure of the supply chain. Note that the country elevating activity (included related
services for drying, blending, etc.) could be often carried out by Farms, Cooperatives, Crushers,
Mills and Feed Producers. Again, activities for primary processing products (namely: Crushing
and milling) and compound feed processing might be carried out within the same plant.
I. The structure of the supply chain
(This section is common tot the questionnaire for mills and crushers)
(1) Consider the flow chart above: how is this representative of the supply chain
in your country? If not, could you redraw it in a way that best represents
your national supply chain? Note: you might need to draw more than one
chart, since different supply chain structures could be in place (es: soybean vs.
maize, SME?s vs multinational firms,...).
Note: the flow charts resulting from this first question should serve as a basis
to guide the remaining questions of this questionnaire.
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(2) We now talk about the level of vertical integration of firms (i.e. how a firm
deals with the actors upstream or downstream to the supply chain).
(a) What are the most common forms of vertical integration? (e.g.
M&A, long-term contracting, joint ventures, strategic alliances, formal
cooperation,...)
(b) What level of the supply chain are these forms of vertical integration
adopted at? Which are the actors involved?
(c) Generally, is there a leading actor (farms, elevators, mills, crushers,
compound feed processors, distributors) taking action in order to get
integrated?
(d) At each level of the supply chain, can you assess the relative importance
of the forms of vertical integration you described above compared to the
non-integrated activities?
(3) We now talk about the size of the firms operating at the different levels of the
supply chain and the resulting level of market concentration (i.e. the share of
the most important firms over the size of the relevant market).
(a) At each level of the supply chain, is there a relevant share of sizeable firm?
Could you name the first four firms and assess their market share at that
supply chain level? (note: the same firm, if integrated, can appear at more
than one step of the supply chain)
(4) Who are the most important importers for soybeans and maize products in
your country? Are those importers Domestic Aggregators or International
Marketing Companies? Make a distinction between the two different
organizations.
(Domestic Aggregators can buy products either FOB from foreign export
elevators at the origination port directly, or they can buy products CIF at the
destination port from international marketing companies. They then sell the
product FOB to international customers facilities and deliver the product to
99
the facilities themselves)
(5) What are the reference international ports for soybeans and maize import and
export in your country?
II. The compound feed market
From the above section we expect to know the level of concentration of the industry
and the names of market leaders: here we want some more details.
(6) What is the share of nationally sourced maize used by compound feed
producers? Do they import maize as grains, by-products, or products of
primary processing?
(7) What is the share of nationally sourced soybean used by compound feed
producers? Do they import soybean as grains, by-products, or products of
primary processing?
(8) Can you assess the relative share of national compound feed producers with
respect to the multinational ones? Which are the most important national
compound feed producers? Which are the most important multinational ones?
Are there specific ones for soybeans or maize?
(Please provide the names and a brief description of who they are ? property
structure, main activities)
(9) What are the national compound feed processors’ main suppliers? Cold you
distinguish between national and international ones?
(Please provide the names and a brief description of who they are ?
property structure, main activities, moreover distinguish the level and form
of integration the suppliers have with compound feed processors)
(10) What is the share of farms and elevators dealing with compound feed producers
directly?
(11) We now talk about the compound feed market and trade:
(a) Distinguishing between maize and soybean based products, what is the
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share of exported output (towards European Union) for the compound
feed industry?
(b) Distinguishing between maize and soybean based products, which are the
most relevant export categories?
(c) Which are the most important European and International suppliers
(nations) of soybean meal/oil and Maize flour/CGF (Corn Gluten
Feed)/CGM (Corn Gluten Meal)? Which are the structures (mills,
crushers, elevators,...) supplying these goods?
III. Supply Chain Deals
(12) How do the compound feed producers deal with their suppliers? Is there any
typical deal between compound feed producers and its supplier for the supply
of soybean and maize? Do they aggregate in doing same activities?
(Please distinguish these deals considering the different form of supplier: farms,
mills or crushers, importers)
(13) Excluding price, what are the main items of the deal? (e.g. how are volumes
and delivering time managed?)
(14) How does the relationship between compound feed producers and foreign
suppliers work? In particular, could explain the dynamics of the purchasing
mechanism when dealing with multinational importer? How do deliveries
work?
(15) How do the compound feed producer deal with their customers? Is there any
typical deal between compound feed producers and its customers for the supply
of compound feed? Do they aggregate in doing same activities?
(Please distinguish these deals considering the different form of customers:
distributors, stock-breeders?)
IV. Pricing mechanism
(16) How does the price setting work when compound feed producer deal with
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mills/crushers/cooperatives/farms or elevators (the upstream stakeholders)?
(Please distinguish between contracts with integrated and non-integrated players
? i.e. market vs. coordination)
(17) 17. How does the price setting work when compound feed producer deal with
distributors/stock-breeders (the downstream stakeholders)?
(please distinguish between contracts with integrated and non-integrated players
? i.e. market vs. coordination)
(18) How does the pricing setting described in the two questions above change when
dealing with foreign suppliers or national ones?
(19) What is the premium price paid (on average) for certified gm-free
soybeans/soybean meal/CGM/CGF/Maize grains/Maize flour?
(20) According to your opinion, what is the competition mostly focused onto? Is it
focused on prices, differentiation or on the services offered?
(21) Are there any reference prices for maize and soybean inputs used by the
compound feed producer? Where are they fixed? Is there a difference between
national and international prices?
(22) Is there any e-procurement program to help processors in finding national or
international maize or soybean suppliers?
(23) In your opinion, which are the factors effecting the fluctuation of feed prices?
(24) Do compound feed producers tend to align their pricing strategies?
V. GM products, non-GM products and segregation
(25) Can you make a distinction between national and multinational players
regarding the segregation and/or identity preservation of gm-free products?
Is the segregation/IP feasibility strongly influenced by the scale and/or by the
structures of the supply chain?
(Please distinguish between maize and soybean and between national and
imported products)
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(26) Do national compound feed producers implement segregation/identity
preservation systems for ensuring the supply of gm-free products? What about
the multinational ones?
(Please distinguish between maize and soybean and between national and
imported products)
(27) Which are the mostly adopted techniques for segregating products and/or
ensuring Identity Preservation used by compound feed producers?
(Please distinguish between maize and soybean and between national and
imported products)
(a) Do these measures eventually affect the feed prices?
(b) Is vertical integration a feasible point for these procedures?
VI. Certifiers and certifications
(28) Who are the certifiers involved in endorsing segregated and identity preserved
gm-free products?
(29) Which form of monitoring is the mostly adopted by non-integrated compound
feed producers to control their suppliers? Which is the one mostly adopted for
integrated compound feed producers? Is there any regional/national plan to
inspect for gm products at this stage of the supply chain?
(30) Do the compound feed producers require any GM-free certification to their
national and international suppliers? Can you name three of the more common
certification required to suppliers?
(31) Are the compound feed producers required to certify the identity preservation
of their GM-free product? Can you name three of the more common
certification for processors?
(32) Is the processing activity the most problematic phase for the identity
preservation of GM-free products? If not, which is in your opinion the most
critical phase?
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Questionnaire to the experts of the market primary processing products
This questionnaire shares both the sketch and the first section with the previous one;
what changes is the structure and the number of questions listed in sections II though
VI.
II. The market of primary processed maize and soybean
From the above section we expect to know the level of concentration of the industry
and the names of market leaders: here we want some more details.
(6) What is the share of nationally sourced maize used by Italian maize mills? Do
they import maize as only dried grains do they import maize by-products as
well?
(7) What is the share of nationally sourced soybean used by [Country] soybean
crushers?
(8) Can you assess the relative share of national maize mills and soybeans
crushers with respect to the multinational ones (we mostly refer to the
primary processing activity eventually integrated by large multinational feed
industries)? Which are the most important national producers of maize and
soybean primary processing products (we refer to soybean meal, soybean oil,
maize flour, maize starch, distilled dried grains, corn gluten feed, corn gluten
meal)? Which are the most important multinational ones?
(Please provide the names and a brief description of who they are ? property
structure, main activities)
(9) Which are the national maize mills’ and soybean crushers’ main suppliers
(downstream integrated firms shall be considered)? Cold you distinguish
between national and international ones?
(Please provide the names and a brief description of who they are ? property
structure, main activities..., moreover distinguish the level and form of
integration the suppliers have with compound feed processors)
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(10) We now talk about the primary processing products? international trade:
(a) Distinguishing between maize and soybean primary processing products,
what is the share of exported output towards European Union?
(b) Distinguishing between maize and soybean primary processing products,
which are the most relevant export categories?
(c) Which are the most important European and International suppliers
(nations) of soybean and Maize inputs for the primary processing
industry? Which are the structures (international marketing
companies, domestic aggregators, small exporters, large European
farms/cooperatives/elevators,...) supplying these goods?
III. Supply chain deals
(11) How do the maize mills and the soybean crushers deal with their suppliers?
How are deliveries managed in order to address the crushing/milling process?
(Please distinguish these deals considering the different form of supplier: farms,
elevators, importers,...)
(12) Excluding price, what are the main items of the deal? (e.g. how are volumes
and delivering time managed?)
(13) How does the relationship between the maize mills and the soybean crushers
work when dealing with foreign suppliers? In particular, could explain
the dynamics of the purchasing mechanism when dealing with multinational
importer? How do deliveries work?
(14) How the maize mills and soybean crushers deal with their customers? Is there
any typical deal between primary processing products? producers and either
customer for the supply of maize and soybean derivatives? Do they aggregate
in doing same activities?
(Please distinguish these deals considering the different form of customers:
distributors, stock-breeders, compound feed producers,...)
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(15) If possible, try to assess which is the difference between the share of primary
processing products sold to the compound feed industry and the share directly
sold to the final consumer.
IV. Pricing mechanism
(16) How does the price setting work when maize mills/soybean crushers deal with
cooperatives/farms or elevators (the upstream stakeholders)?
(Please distinguish between contracts with integrated and non-integrated players
? i.e. market vs. coordination)
(17) How does the price setting work when maize mills/soybean crushers deal
with distributors/stock-breeders/compound feed producers (the downstream
stakeholders)?
(Please distinguish between contracts with integrated and non-integrated players
? i.e. market vs. coordination)
(18) How does the pricing setting described in the two questions above change
when dealing with foreign suppliers (international marketing companies,
aggregators,...) or national ones?
(19) What is the premium price paid (on average) for certified GM-free maize and
soybean inputs for primary processing?
(20) According to your opinion, what is the competition mostly focused onto? Is it
focused on prices, differentiation or on the services offered?
(21) Are there any reference prices for maize and soybean inputs used by
mills/crushers? Where are they fixed? Is there a difference between national
and international prices?
(22) Is there any e-procurement program to help processors in finding national or
international maize or soybean suppliers?
(23) In your opinion, which are the factors effecting the fluctuation of the prices of
primary processing products (make a distinction between maize and soybeans)?
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V. GM products, non-GM products and segregation
(24) Can you make a distinction between national and multinational players
regarding the segregation and/or identity preservation of gm-free products?
Is the segregation/IP feasibility strongly influenced by the scale and/or by the
structures of the supply chain?
(Please distinguish between maize and soybean and between national and
imported products)
(25) Do national maize mills and soybean crushers implement segregation/identity
preservation systems for ensuring the supply of gm-free products? What about
the multinational ones?
(Please distinguish between maize and soybean and between national and
imported products)
(26) Which are the mostly adopted techniques for segregating products and/or
ensuring Identity Preservation used by maize mills and soybean crushers?
(Please distinguish between maize and soybean and between national and
imported products)
(a) Do these measures eventually affect the feed prices?
(b) Is vertical integration a feasible point for these procedures?
VI. Certifiers and certifications
(27) Who are the certifiers involved in endorsing segregated and identity preserved
gm-free products?
(28) Which form of monitoring is the mostly adopted by non-integrated
mills/crushers to control their suppliers? Which is the one mostly adopted
for integrated mills/crushers? Is there any regional/national plan to inspect
for gm products at this stage of the supply chain?
(29) Do the mills/crushers require any GM-free certification to their national and
international suppliers? Can you name three of the more common certification
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required to suppliers?
(30) Are the mills/crushers required to certify the identity preservation of their
GM-free product? Can you name three of the more common certification for
processors?
(31) Is the crushing/milling activity the most problematic phase for the identity
preservation of GM-free products? If not, which is in your opinion the most
critical phase?
108
Questionnaire to importers and/or international traders
Structure of the intenrational supply chain. This figure depicts a sketch of the
international supply chain for maize and soybean raw material
I. Product and information flow
(1) Consider the flow chart above: how is this representative of the supply chain,
from the origination country to the destination country, importers deal with?
If not, could you redraw it in a way that best represents it?
(2) Consider the flow chart above: to what extent of the soybean supply chain are
International Marketing Companies integrated?
(a) Do they have control over the upstream activities like crushing, elevating
or farming?
(b) Do they have control over any downstream activity as well (crushing,
transportation)?
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(c) Which is the most common form of vertical integration/coordination
International Marketing Companies adopt to deal with the actors
upstream or downstream the supply chain? (Hierarchy, M&A, long-term
contracting, joint ventures, strategic alliances, formal cooperation,...)
(3) Consider now foreign buyer willing to purchase a soybean products from an
importer (it cloud be either an International Marketing Cooperative or a
domestic Aggregator): could you describe how the dealing begins? Please
focus, among other things, on the role of brokers in international trade for
soybeans and its derivatives.
(a) Could you describe how many and which are the actors involved in the
purchasing/selling activity?
(4) Could you assess what share of soybean products is delivered through FOB
contracts and what share is delivered through CIF contracts, instead?
(a) Could you make a distinction between the characteristics of enterprises
willing to buy products CIF and the characteristics of firms buying
products through FOB contracts?
(b) Is there a distinction when considering either soybean meal or soybean
grains?
(5) We now consider that the foreign buyer signed a sales contract with the
importer. We want to understand how the information is transmitted upstream
in order to have the right product (in terms of volume and qualitative
attributes) reaching its destination.
(a) In particular, could you explain which are the offices and departments
(namely: origination offices, international marketing offices, destination
offices, satellite offices, etc.) involved in the information flow and the
specific role they play in the information flow management (i.e. who is
the information transmitted to?).
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(b) Could you also indicate also which information is required to be forwarded
and how long it takes before the product is shipped?
(c) Last, could you describe the differences, if any, between the information
flow management for regular products and that for Identity Preserved
Products?
(6) Suppose now that the order was fully processed:
(a) Could you explain how is the product delivered and which information goes
along with the product through the different offices from the origination
country to the destination port?
(b) In particular, could you describe the delivery modes (CIF, FOB, other)
through each subsequent step along the product flow from the origination
country to the destination port?
(c) Based on the origination port it is shipped from: how long does the product
take to reach the destination port?
(d) Again, could you make a difference between the procedures followed for
regular products and those followed for Identity Preserved products?
II. Actors involved, operations and responsibilities at the origination port
textitWe now consider which dynamics take place at the origination port
before and while the products are inbound. In particular, we want to describe how
and by whom the products are loaded on trans-ocean logistic carriers? vessels and
then shipped to the destination port.
(7) Could you explain what relationships international marketing companies
(IMC) establish with origination port?s operators?
(A detailed description of all the operations run by these two port operators is
needed. Besides, a detailed description about what the international marketing
companies require, in terms of procedures and guarantees, from the dischargers
and the elevators shall be given as well)
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(a) Are port activities usually integrated by international marketing
companies?
(b) If we were talking about Identity Preserved GM-free products:
(i) Could you explain how these relationships change in terms of both
relevance and procedures adopted (from a technical/ bureaucratic
point of view and from a liability point of view) for avoiding
commingling and adventitious presence?
(ii) When would the product be tested (along this process chain) and who
would be responsible for testing?
(iii) What would be the role of GM-free products? certifiers during these
operations?
(8) We are still talking about products which need to be Identity Preserved but
more precisely, we now refer to GM-free products:
(a) Which point of the port logistic network are the tests for detecting GM
events carried out at?
(b) How many tests are carried out?
(c) Who is responsible of testing the products (namely: the IMC, the foreign
buyer, the port operators)?
(d) What is (if any) the role of certifiers in product testing?
(e) Suppose that one result from the product testing showed a GM threshold
above 0,9%. Based on the point along the port?s logistic network (from
the inbound vessel to the outbound truck/train) the tests were carried
out, who would be liable for the adventitious presence if any product was
found positive to the presence of GM material over an agreed threshold?
(9) Which are the most important certifiers for international flows of GM-free IP
products?
(10) How is the relationship between international marketing companies (or other
importers) and certifiers form IP products? Is certification managed at the
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corporate level or should every single office work to get the product he is
charged to handle certified?
III. Actors involved, operations and responsibilities at the destination port
We now consider which dynamics take place at the destination port before, while
and after the products are inbound.
(11) Suppose an inbound soybean cargo has reached the destination port: how are
the batches coming from non-EU countries managed when dealing with the
issue of maintaining Identity Preservation at the port?
(a) Which are the actors involved in discharging and storing?
(A detailed description of all the bureaucratic procedures run by these two
port operators is needed.)
(b) Which is/are the most problematic phase/s when managing identity
preserved GM-free products at this level of the supply chain?
(12) Could you explain what relationships international marketing companies
(IMC) establish with ports? operators?
(a) How do IMC deal with port dischargers and port elevators?
(A detailed description about what the international marketing companies
require, in terms of bureaucratic procedures and guarantees, from the
dischargers and the elevators shall be given)
(b) Could you also explain how these relationships change in terms of both
relevance and procedures adopted (from a technical point of view and from
a liability point of view) when dealing with IP products?
(c) Are port activities usually integrated by international marketing
companies?
(13) We now talk about products which need to be Identity Preserved but more
precisely, we now refer to GM-free products:
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(a) How many tests are carried out after the vessel reached the destination
port?
(b) Which point of the port logistic network are those tests carried out at?
(c) Who is responsible of testing the products (namely: the Importer, the
buyer, the port operators)? In particular, what is (if any) the role of
certifiers?
(d) Are tests certified by the same certifiers who endorsed the products from
the foreign farm to the destination port?
(e) Suppose that one result from the product testing showed a GM threshold
above 0,9%. Based on the point along the port?s logistic network (from
the inbound vessel to the outbound truck/train) the tests were carried
out, who would be liable for the adventitious presence if any product was
found positive to the presence of GM material over an agreed threshold?
(14) Which are the most important certifiers for international flows of GM-free IP
products?
IV. Physical transportation: trans-ocean logistic carriers and International
Trading Companies
First of all, we need to know who are the most important logistic carriers involved
in dry-bulk overseas transportation and their relevance across soybean origination
and destination areas. Furthermore we need to describe some of the most important
characteristics of the trans-oceanic logistic industry (Is that industry concentrated?
What is the competition based upon?).
(15) How do IMC or other importers relate with those trans-ocean logistic
companies for shipping their products around the world?
(a) Is there any international marketing company integrating the trans-ocean
logistic?
(16) How much is (on average) the freight rate for shipping dry-bulk products
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(soybean meal and soybean grains) form USA/Brazil/Argentina to your
country?
(17) How much does the freight rate change when switching from regular
commodities to IP products?
(18) How many overseas logistic carriers can ensure products? Identity
Preservation?
(a) Could you name at least three of the most common logistic carriers for IP
products?
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Appendix B
Under the assumption of an inter-temporally separable, twice continuously differentiable
and homothetic industry-level transformation function, we assume that the
transformation function is:
f(q, z) = 0
where q = (q1, . . . , qN) is a vector of inputs and z = (z1, . . . , zM) is a vector of outputs.
The transformation function satisfies
M∑
l=1
∂f
∂logzl
≡ −1
The firm’s objective can be state as the following minimization problem:
min
q
pqT
s.t. f(q, z) = 0
We construct with corresponding Lagrangian function
L (q, λ) = pqT − λf (q, z) =
n∑
i=1
piqi − λf (q, z)
Differentiation this expression with respect to logqi and re-arranging leads to:
piqi − λ ∂f
∂logqi
= 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , N (B.1)
with solution at q∗(z,p) = {q∗i (z,p); i = 1, . . . , N} and λ > 0.
Total cost and Marginal Cost
Define the total cost function as:
pTq∗ = C (p,q∗) = C (p,q∗(z,p)) =
N∑
i=1
piq
∗
i (z,p) ≡ C
Define also the contribution of the ith input to the total cost as:
C (p,q∗) [piq∗i ]
−1 = hi (B.2)
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This quantity measures the relative importance of each input to the multi-product firm
in terms of its contribution to the total cost.
Now, the Marginal cost of the lth output is:
∂C (p,q∗)
∂zr
=
∂
∑N
i=1 piq
∗
i
∂zl
=
N∑
i=1
pi
∂q∗i
∂zl
=
C
zl
N∑
i=1
hi
∂ log q∗i
∂ log zl
The differentiation of f(q∗, z) = 0 with respect to log zl leads to:
∂f (q∗, z)
∂ log zl
= ∇logqf (q∗, z)

∂ log q1
∗
∂ log zl
...
∂ log qn
∗
∂ log zl
+ ∂f (q
∗, z)
∂ log zl
∂ log zl
∂ log zl
= 0
where the first vector product can be also written as:
N∑
i=1
∂f
∂ log qi
∂ log qi
∂ log zl
where, using (B.1), ∂f
∂ log qi
is equal to piqi
λ
and, using (B.2), piqi = C/hi. Therefore:
N∑
i=1
∂f
∂ log qi
∂ log qi
∂ log zl
=
N∑
i=1
piqi
λ
∂ log qi
∂ log zl
=
N∑
i=1
C
hi
λ
∂ log qi
∂ log zl
=
C
λ
N∑
i=1
hi
∂ log qi
∂ log zl
It follows that:
∂f (q∗, z)
∂ log zl
=
C
λ
N∑
i=1
hi
∂ log qi
∂ log zl
+
∂f (q∗, z)
∂ log zl
= 0
Now, since
∂C
∂zl
zl
λ
=
zl
λ
C
zl
N∑
i=1
hi
∂ log qi
∂ log zl
then:
∂C
∂zl
zl
λ
+
∂f (q∗, z)
∂ log zl
= 0
Therefore, the summation over l gives:
M∑
l=1
[
∂C
∂zl
zl
λ
+
∂f (q∗, z)
∂ log zl
]
=
M∑
l=1
∂C
∂zl
zl
λ
+
M∑
l=1
∂f (q∗, z)
∂ log zl
=
M∑
l=1
∂C
∂zl
zl
λ
− 1 = 0
hence
λ =
M∑
l=1
∂C
∂zl
zl
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This indicates that, for the multi-product firm, λ corresponds to the marginal cost
of a proportionate increase in the outputs or, in other words, the total marginal cost
(each input being evaluated at its marginal cost). Sticking with the total marginal cost
interpretation of λ, it is possible to define
gl =
zl
λ
∂C
∂zl
∀l = 1, . . . ,m
which corresponds to the contribution of the lth output to the total marginal cost.
Therefore, an aggregate output index may be defied by allpying the Divisia decomposition
to the definition of λ:
d(logZ) ≡
M∑
l=1
gld(log zl)
which implies Z ≡∑ml=1 glzl. Furthermore, from the definition of gl it is easy to see that:
∂C
∂zl
zl
λ
+
∂f (q∗, z)
∂ log zl
= gl +
∂f (q∗, z)
∂ log zl
= 0
hence
∂f (q∗, z)
∂ log zl
= −gl
Proportionate output elasticities
The total differential of f (q∗, z) is given by (in vector notation):
∇logqf (q∗, z) d log q +∇log zf (q∗, z) d log z
Since the f (q∗, z) = 0, (q∗, z) lies on the transformation frontier of the productions set
hence (Mas-Colell et al., 1995)
∇logqf (q∗, z) d log q +∇log zf (q∗, z) d log z = 0 (B.4)
This can be also expressed in the form
n∑
i=1
∂f
∂ log qi
dl log qi +
m∑
l=1
∂f
∂ log zl
d log zl = 0
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Under the assumption that inputs and outputs change proportionately, then d log qi and
d log zl can be placed out of the summations:
d log qi
N∑
i=1
∂f
∂ log qi
+ d log zl
M∑
l=1
∂f
∂ log zl
= 0 (B.3)
Using
N∑
i=1
∂f
∂ log qi
=
N∑
i=1
piq
∗
i
λ
=
C
λ
M∑
l=1
∂f
∂ log zl
= −1
equation (B.3) can be re-written as
d log qi
C
λ
− d log zl = 0 ⇐⇒ C
λ
=
∂f(q,z)
∂ log qi
=
d log zl
d log qi
Letting the outputs change proportionately and letting the inputs do the same, C
λ
can be
generalized for each l and i. This ratio represents the elasticity of proportionate output
with respect to a proportionate input, at q∗. Another interpretation is that of elasticity
of scale of a multi-product firm at q∗.
On the other hand, the reciprocal of the former ratio represents the elasticity of (total)
cost with respect to a proportionate (global) output increase:
λ
C
=
∑M
l=i
∂C
∂zl
C
=
M∑
l=1
∂ logC
∂ log zl
≡ γ
Last, from the f.o.c. piqi−λ∂f(b,z)∂ log qi , C =
∑n
i=1 piq
∗
i and hi =
piqi
C
we can obtain Chiqi = piqi
and the following identity:
piqi
λ
=
hiC
λ
=
∂f(q,z)
∂ log qi
Since γ =
(
λ
C
)−1
, then
∂f(q,z)
∂ log qi
= hiγ
−1
This in turn implies that:
hiγ
−1 =
∂f(q,z)
∂ log qi
=
d log zl
d log qi
However, the interpretation of hiγ
−1 is different from C
λ
: the first expression implies that
we keep all inputs constant and we let input i vary, hence it represents the elasticity of
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proportionate (global) output with respect to the ith input, at q∗. In conclusion, ∂f(q,z)
∂ log qi
has two different interpretations depending on whether we assume inputs proportionate
or not.
Demand for inputs, preliminary
First of all, consider the second-order logarithmic derivatives of f (q, z) = 0
H =
∂2f (q, z)
∂ log q ∂ log qT
(N ×N)
H∗ =
∂2f (q, z)
∂ log q ∂ log zT
(N ×M)
Additionally, given the total differential defined in (B.4):
H∗ι = 0
where ι is an (M × 1) vector of ones.
Consider now the Lagrangian function of the cost minimization problem evaluated at the
solution q∗ (p, z) and λ∗ (p, z):
L (q∗ (p, z) , λ∗ (p, z)) = pq∗
′
(p, z)− λ∗ (p, z) f (q∗ (p, z) , z)
=
n∑
i=1
piq
∗
i (p, z)− λ∗ (p, z) f (q∗ (p, z) , z)
The f.o.c. evaluated at q∗ (p, z) and λ∗ (p, z) is therefore:
piq
∗
i (p, z)− λ∗ (p, z)
∂f (p, z)
∂logqi
= 0, ∀i = 1, ..., n
The partial derivative of this expression with respect to log zl is:
piq
∗
i
∂ log q∗i
∂ log zl
− λ∗∂ log λ
∗
∂ log zl
∂ log f
∂ log qi
− λ∗
N∑
j=1
∂2f
∂ log qi∂ log qj
∂ log q∗j
?∂ log zl
− λ∗ ∂
2f
∂ log qi∂ log zl
= 0
or, given −piqi ∂λ∗∂ log zl = −λ∗
∂ log λ∗
∂ log zl
∂ log f
∂ log qi
:
piq
∗
i
∂ log q∗i
∂ log zl
− piqi ∂λ
∗
∂ log zl
− λ∗
N∑
j=1
∂2f
∂ log qi∂ log qj
∂ log q∗j
?∂ log zl
− λ∗ ∂
2f
∂ log qi∂ log zl
= 0
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Laitinen and Theil (1978) shows that if all i, l pairs are be divided by C, then one can
use γ = λ
C
and hi =
piqi
C
to get the following expression:
(F− γH) ∂ log q
∗ (z,p)
∂ log z′
− Fι∂ log λ
∗(z,p)
∂ log z′
= γH
where F ≡ diag(hi).
The f.o.c. evaluated at the optimum can be also differentiated with respect to pj,
for i 6= j, and qi. The second-order partial derivative of the Lagrangian function
evaluated at q∗ and λ∗ with respect to pj, for i 6= j, divided by C is:
hi
∂ log q∗i
∂ log pj
− hi∂ log λ
∗
∂ log pj
− γ
n∑
k=1
∂2f
∂ log qi∂ log qk
∂ log q∗k
∂ log pj
= 0
with i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. On the other hand, the partial derivative of the f.o.c. at q∗ and
λ∗ with respect to log qi, divided by C is:
(F− γH) ∂ log q
∗ (z,p)
∂ log p′
− Fι∂ log λ
∗(z,p)
∂ log p′
= −F
Now take the value function f (q∗ (p, z) , z) and differentiate it with respect to p and q:
∂f (q∗ (p, z) , z)
∂ log z′
= 0 ⇒ ιF∂ log q
∗
∂ log z′
= γg′
∂f (q∗ (p, z) , z)
∂ log p′
= 0 ⇒ ιF∂ log q
∗
∂ log p′
= 0
where g = (g1, . . . , gm).
These results can be put together to obtain the following system of equations:
(F− γH) ∂ log q
∗ (z,p)
∂ log z′
− F ι∂ log λ
∗(z,p)
∂ log z′
= γH = γH
hi
∂ log q∗i
∂ log pj
− hi∂ log λ
∗
∂ log pj
− γ∑nk=1 ∂2f∂ log qi∂ log qk ∂ log q
∗
k
∂ log pj
= 0
(F− γH) ∂ log q
∗ (z,p)
∂ log p′
− Fι∂ log λ
∗(z,p)
∂ log p′
− F
ιF
∂ log q∗
∂ log z′
= γg′
ιF
∂ log q∗
∂ log p′
= 0
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which can be expressed in matrix notations as:F−1 (F− γH) F−1 ι
ι′ 0

F
∂ log q∗ (z,p)
∂ log z′
∂ log q∗ (z,p)
∂ log p′
−∂ log λ
∗
∂ log z′
−∂ log λ
∗
∂ log p′
 =
γF−1H∗ −I
γg′ 0

or
AB = C
Since H is assumed to be a symmetric and positive-definite matrix, F is a constant matrix
and γ is a constant, then A is also symmetric and positive-definite. Define the inverse of
A as:
A−1 =
ψ(Θ− θθT ) θ
θ′ − 1
ψ

where:
ψ = ιF(F− γH)−1Fι > 0 is a scalar
Θ =
1
ψ
F(F− γH)−1F is a vector
θ = Θι =
1
ψ
F(F− γH)−1Fι is a scalar
If A is invertible, the system has a solution in:
B = A−1C
where
B =
γθg′ + γψ(Θ− θθ′)F−1H∗ −ψ(Θ− θθ′)
γ
ψ
g′ − γθ′f−1H∗ θ′

hence γθg′ + γψ(Θ− θθ′)F−1H∗ −ψ(Θ− θθ′)
γ
ψ
g′ − γθ′F−1H∗ θ′
 =
F∂ logq∗∂ log z′ F∂ logq∗∂ logp′
−∂ log λ∗
∂ log z′ −∂ log λ
∗
∂ logp′

Let now q∗ be the demand of input for the multi-product firm, then the total differential
(in logarithms) pre-multiplied by F is given by:
Fd log q∗ = F
∂ log q∗
∂ log z′
d log z + F
∂ log q∗
∂ log p′
d log p
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since F∂ logq
∗
∂ log z′ = γθg
′ + γψ(Θ − θθ′)F−1H∗, F∂ logq∗
∂ logp′ = −ψ(Θ − θθ′), g′ = ι′G and
G ≡ diag(gl) for l = 1, . . . ,M , this expression becomes:
Fd log q∗ = γ
[
θ′ι′ + γψ (Θ− θθ′) F−1H∗G−1] d log z− ψ (Θ− θθ′)]d log p
the ith element of the vector Fd log q∗, hid log q∗i , represents the quantity component of
the change in the ith factor share hi or, in other words, the change in the contribution of
input i to total cost due to a change in the quantity of qi. This can be verified by taking
the differential of hi =
piqi
C
:
dhi = hid log pi + hid log qi − hid logC
Any change in hi is therefore related to a change in either qi, pi or C.
Marginal share of the inputs: recall the definition of the Lagrange multiplier for
the multi-product firm:
λ =
M∑
l=1
∂C
∂zl
zl
which corresponds to
λ =
M∑
l=1
∂C
∂ log zl
=
N∑
i=1
[
M∑
l=1
∂(piq
∗
i )
∂ log zl
]
If we multiply both sides by 1
λ
and disaggregate across i we get:
θi =
1
λ
M∑
l=1
∂(piq
∗
i )
∂ log zl
where θi ∈ θ is the share of the ith input in the total marginal cost. To see why this is
the case, re-write the right-hand side as
1
λ
m∑
l=1
∂(piq
∗
i )
∂ log zl
=
C
λ
m∑
l=1
hi
∂q∗i
∂ log zl
=
1
γ
m∑
l=1
hi
∂q∗i
∂ log zl
∈ γ−1F ∂ log q
∗
∂ log z
ι
Since F∂ logq
∗
∂ log z′ = γθg
′ + γψ(Θ− θθ′)F−1H∗, g′ι = 1, H∗ι = 0 and H∗∗ι = 0 then
[
γθg′ + γψ(Θ− θθ′)F−1H∗] ι = θ
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We may also define the share of the ith input in the marginal cost of each individual
output as:
θli =
∂(piq
∗
i )/∂zl
∂C/∂zl
∀l = 1, . . . ,M ; i = 1, . . . , N
Such that
∑M
l=1 glθ
l
i = θi. To prove this note that, given the definitions of gl and γ
∂(piq
∗
i )/∂zl
∂C/∂zl
=
piqi
∂C/∂zl
∂ log q∗i
∂ log zl
1
zl
=
Chi
λgl
∂ log q∗i
∂ log zl
=
hi
γgl
∂ log q∗i
∂ log zl
The latter member of this expression is an element of the (M×N) matrix γ−1F(∂ log q∗)/
(∂ log z)G−1. Given that F∂ logq
∗
∂ log z′ = γθg
′ + γψ(Θ− θθ′)F−1H∗ and g′G−1 = ι′, then
γ−1
[
γθg′ + γψ(Θ− θθ′)F−1H∗]G−1 = ψ(Θ− θθ′)FF−1H∗G−1
where
ψ(Θ− θθ′)F−1H∗G−1 = (θ1 − θ ... θm − θ)
θl = (θl1 ... θ
l
n)
(B.5)
Now, the post-multiplication of this expression by g gives
M∑
l=1
glθ
l
i = θi ∀l = 1, . . . ,M ; ∀i = 1, . . . , N
A first input demand specification: given the results obtained in the previous
paragraph and recalling that
Fd log q∗ = γ
[
θ′ι′ + γψ (Θ− θθ′) F−1H∗G−1] d log z− ψ (Θ− θθ′)]d log p
it is easy to see that [
θ′ι′ + γψ (Θ− θθ′) F−1H∗G−1] = (θ1 ... θm)
therefore:
hid log q
∗
i = γ
M∑
l=1
θligld log zl + price term
where the price term is the ith entry of −ψ (Θ− θθ′) d log p. Since θ = Θι = ψ−1F(F−
γH−1F)ι, then (Θ− θθ′) = Θ (I − ιθ′) and the ith entry of −ψ (Θ− θθ′) d log p =
−ψΘ (I − ιθ′) d log p is
−ψ
N∑
j=1
θi,j
[
d log pj − d log
N∑
i=1
θipi
]
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or
−ψ
N∑
j=1
θi,j
[
d log pj − d log P˜
]
where P˜ is the Fisher input price index and j, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Therefore, the differential
demand for the ith input is given by:
hid log q
∗
i = γ
M∑
l=1
θligld log zl − ψ
N∑
j=1
θi,j
[
d log pj − d log P˜
]
= γ
M∑
l=1
θligld log zl − ψ
N∑
j=1
θi,jd
[
log
pj
P˜
]
The coefficient θi,j is an element in the (N × N) symmetric positive definite matrix Θ,
while ψθi,j is the coefficient associated with the j
th relative price.
This expression describes the change in input’s i demand in terms of a global output
change and the change in own/cross-input prices corrected by the Fisher’s price index.
Moreover, given θ = Θι = ψ−1F(F− γH−1F)ι and ι′θ = 1, the above demand satisfies
N∑
j=1
θi,j = θi
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
θi,j = 1
Input-output separability, input allocation decision and demand for inputs
Input-output separability: The assumption of input-output separability can be
captured through the following notation:
f(q, z) = fz(z)− fq(q) = 0
This condition imposes an additional constraint on H∗: Laitinen and Theil (1978) show
that
F−1H∗ = ιa′
where a′ is an M -dimensional row tuple. This result implies that F−1H∗ consists of
identical rows if input-output separability holds.
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Input-output separability has an implication on the parameters θli, i.e. the contributions
of the ith input to the marginal cost of the lth output. In fact, the marginal share of each
input is the same across outputs, namely:
θli = θi
for each pair (i, l). To verify this, recall the expression ψ(Θ − θθ′)F−1H∗G−1; given
F−1H∗ = ιa′, then
ψ(Θ− θθ′)F−1H∗G−1 = ψ(Θ− θθ′)ιa′
Since θ = Θι = 1
ψ
F(F− γH)−1Fι and θ′ι = 1, then
(Θ− θθ′)ι = 0
In light of (B.5), it is easily seen that(
θ1 − θ ... θM − θ) = 0
which implies θli = θi and
n∑
i=1
θli = 1
Input allocation decision: The separation of input allocation decision from the
total-input decision adds more structure to the differential demand equation and provides
additional information. In order to specify the model accordingly, we first need to define
the Divisia volume index for the inputs
d logQ =
N∑
i=1
hid log q
∗
i = Fd log q
∗
It is easy to see that hid log q
∗
i is the contribution of the i
th input to this index. Therefore
N∑
i=1
[hid log q
∗
i ] =
N∑
i=1
[
γ
M∑
l=1
θligld log zl − ψ
N∑
j=1
θi,jd
(
log
pj
P˜
)]
corresponds to
d logQ = γ
N∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
θligld log zl − ψ
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
θi,jd
(
log
pj
P˜
)
126
since
∑M
l=1 glθ
l
i = θi, ∀l = 1, . . . ,M ,
∑N
i=1 θi = 1 and
∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1 θi,j = 1, then
d logQ = γ
M∑
l=1
d log zl − ψ
M∑
j=1
d
(
log
pj
P˜
)
where
∑M
l=1 d log zl = d logZ is the Divisia volume index of the output and
∑M
j=1 d(
log pj/P˜
)
= 0. Therefore:
d logQ = γd logZ
Note that, if we assumed input-output separability,
∑N
i=1 θ
l
i = 1 and
∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1 θi,j = 1
would have been sufficient.
The above expression indicates that the total input decision is proportional to the Divisia
volume index of the output by a factor γ. Therefore, input prices play no role in
determining the total input decision.
Demand for inputs: the pre-multiplication of d logQ = γd logZ by θi gives the
following expression:
θi
N∑
i=1
hid log q
∗
i = θiγ
M∑
l=1
gld log zl ⇐⇒ θid logQ = θiγd logZ (B.6)
Substituting equation (B.6) into hid log q
∗
i = γ
∑M
l=1 θ
l
igld log zl−ψ
∑N
j=1 θi,jd
[
log pj/P˜
]
and re-arranging produces
hid log q
∗
i = θid logQ+ γΨi − ψ
N∑
j=1
θi,jd
[
log pj/P˜
]
where Ψi = γ
∑M
l=1 gl
(
θli − θi
)
d log zl. Since d logZ =
∑M
l=1 gld log zl and θi =
∑M
l=1 glθ
l
i,
d logZ and θi can be interpreted as weighted averages of log zl and θ
l
i respectively. It
follows that an alternative way to specify this term is
Ψi =
M∑
l=1
gl
(
θli − θi
)
(d log zl − d logZ)
Therefore, Ψi is interpreted as the sample covariance between the amount of output l
and the contribution of input i to the marginal cost of that particular output. The
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reason to include Ψi in the equation is quite straightforward: a change in the l
th output
determines an increase in the demand for input i in excess of θid logQ when the change
in output is positively correlated with marginal share of the input (i.e., when d log zl
and θli are positively correlated). Note that, if we assumed input-output separability, the
term γ
∑M
l=1 gl
(
θli − θi
)
d log zl would disappear because θ
l
i = θi; therefore, under such
assumption:
hid log q
∗
i = θid logQ− ψ
N∑
j=1
θi,jd
[
log pj/P˜
]
This implies that the input allocation decision is independent of the change in output.
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Appendix C
Let Ω be the NT ×NT variance-covariance matrix of the NT × 1 stacked random vector
ε such that E
[
εεT
∣∣X] = Ω, where X is a NT ×NT block-diagonal matrix with typical
block (∆Q,∆p1,∆p2,∆p3,∆p4) and ∆pj = (∆pj1, . . . ,∆pjT ). Below, we specify Ω in
order to account for (within-equation) autocorrelation and contemporaneous correlation
between equations. Consistently with Parks (1967), Greene (2003) and Wooldridge
(2010), define the N × N matrix of contemporaneous correlations as Σ = {σij} and
indicate with Pj the T × T matrix
Pj =

(1− ρjρj)−1/2 0 0 . . . 0
ρj(1− ρjρj)−1/2 1 0 . . . 0
ρ2j(1− ρjρj)−1/2 ρj 1 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
ρT−1j (1− ρjρj)−1/2 ρT−2j ρT−3j . . . 1

where ρj is the autoregressive coefficient of the typical equation εjt = ρjεjt−1 + ujt
with |ρj| < 1. A system-variance-covariance matrix embodying autocorrelation and
between-eqation contemporaneous correlation can be then specified as P (Σ⊗ IT) P′,
where IT is a T × T identity matrix and P is a NT × NT block-diagonal matrix with
typical block Pj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Using first-stage system-OLS residuals of (3.6)
we estimate each component inside Ω. In particular, let εˆ := y − XΠˆOLS, where
y = (h¯11∆q11, . . . , h¯NT∆qNT ), Πˆ = (θ1, . . . , θN , pˆi1, . . . , pˆiN) and pˆij = (pˆij1, . . . , pˆijN);
then ρˆj are obtained from the regression of εˆjt on εˆjt−1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Similarly,
each component of the Σ matrix is computed as σˆij := T
−1∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 uˆituˆjt for all
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} with uˆjt = εˆit − ρˆεˆit−1. The estimated variance-covariance matrix Ωˆ is
used to estimate model (3.6) by FGLS and compute ˆˆε = y−XΠˆFGLS, ˆˆρ, ˆˆσij and, finally,
ˆˆΩ. The process is repeated until ΠˆFGLS converges.
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Appendix D
We introduce the general SVAR methodology starting with the classical matrix
representation of a dynamic simultaneous equation model 8
Γyt = A(L)yt + εt (D.1)
where yt is a K × 1 vector of time series, Γ represents a K × K invertible matrix of
coefficients such that
Γ ≡

γ11 γ12 . . . γ1K
γ21 γ22 . . . γ2K
...
...
. . .
...
γK1 γK2 . . . γKK

and A(L) denotes a matrix of polynomials in the lag operator L
A(L) ≡

A(L)11 A(L)12 . . . A(L)1K
A(L)12 A(L)22 . . . A(L)2K
...
...
. . .
...
A(L)1K A(L)2K . . . A(L)KK

Last, εt indicates a K× 1 random vector of structural innovation defined as εt ∼ (0,Σε),
where
Σε =

σ11 σ12 . . . σ1K
σ21 σ22 . . . σ2K
...
...
. . .
...
σ1K σ2K . . . σKK
 .
and each σii denotes the variance of the i
th innovation and σij is the respective
covariance. We can now expand model (D.1) to have a more clear representation of
8 If we extracted the kth equation from (D.1) we would obtain the following expression
K∑
i=1
γi1yit =
K∑
i=1
A(L)i1yit + ε1t
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the contemporaneous and/or pre-determined relationship between the variables included
in yt
γ11 γ12 . . . γ1K
γ21 γ22 . . . γ2K
...
...
. . .
...
γK1 γK2 . . . γKK


y1t
y2t
...
yKt
 =

A(L)11 A(L)12 . . . A(L)1K
A(L)12 A(L)22 . . . A(L)2K
...
...
. . .
...
A(L)1K A(L)2K . . . A(L)KK


y1t
y2t
...
yKt
+

ε1t
ε2t
...
εKt

The SVAR analysis begins by specifying the reduced from of equation (D.1); since Γ is
invertible, model (D.1) can be re-written as
yt = Γ
−1A(L)yt + Γ
−1εt
or
yt = A
∗(L)yt + et (D.2)
which represents the VAR reduced form of the original SVAR specification. The
variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form innovation vector et is expressed as
Σe = Γ
−1ΣεΓ−1
′
. Model (D.2) can be estimated in a straightforward way in order to
obtain reduced form parameters. Next, a useful Moving Average (MA) re-parametrization
of equation (D.1) is obtained using the Wold’s decomposition theorem: the endogenous
variables in yt are expressed as function of current and past reduced form innovations
yt = Φ(L)et (D.3)
where Φ(L) ≡ (IK −A∗(L)−1). For example, take yt = (y1t, y2t)′ and et = (e1t, e2t)′, then
equation (D.3) can be represented in full matrix notation asy1t
y2t
 =
Φ(0)11 Φ(0)12
Φ(0)21 Φ(0)22
e1t
e2t
+
Φ(1)11 Φ(1)12
Φ(1)21 Φ(1)22
e1t−1
e2t−1
+
+
Φ(2)11 Φ(2)12
Φ(2)21 Φ(2)22
e1t−2
e2t−2
+ . . .
and each term Φ(h)ik, with i, k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, can be interpreted as the partial derivative
∂yt+h/∂ei,t or, in other words, the response of output i at time t+ h to a unit innovation
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in the reducer form disturbance term ei occurred in period t, holding all other innovations
constant. Based on specification (D.3), we can construct impulse response functions
(IRF) which represent the aggregate plot of Φ(h)ik against t (i.e. the response of output
in time to a unit change in the reduced form innovation term).
Although model (D.2) can be always estimated, at this stage IRFs have no economic
interpretation because they provide responses to shocks in reduced for innovations. In
order to come up with economically meaningful IRFs, one shall re-arrange equation (D.3)
by pre-multiplying et with a K ×K identity matrix:
yt = Φ(L)IKet = Φ(L)Γ
−1Γet = Φ∗(L)εt (D.4)
where Φ∗(L) ≡ Φ(L)Γ−1 and εt = Γet. It follows that the interpretation of the
coefficients inside Γ is different in SVAR models: whereas in the classical dynamic
simultaneous equation setup Γ models the contemporaneous relationships between
endogenous variables, in a SVAR framework it models the contemporaneous relationships
between reduced form innovations.
However, structural coefficients in Γ need to be known in order to compute Φ∗(L); as it
happens in dynamic simultaneous equation systems, this poses an identification problem.
Identification
Whereas the identification of structural parameters in the traditional dynamic
simultaneous equation framework is mainly achieved through non-sample information
(i.e. theoretical exclusion restrictions in Γ), SVAR models are identified by imposing
restrictions both on the structural variance-covariance matrix Σε and inverse of the
coefficient matrix Γ. The restrictions imposed to Σε are standard, while those in Γ
−1 are
based on non-sample information and diminish the contemporaneous relationship among
shocks.
The first type of restrictions are known as orthogonality restrictions : the identification
strategy of SVAR begins with the assumption of uncorrelation among structural
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innovations. Formally, this translates into the following expression:
Σε =

σ11 0 . . . 0
0 σ22 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . σKK

Since reduced form innovation terms are linked to the structural ones through ΓΣeΓ
′ =
Σε, the orthogonality restriction on Σε provide non-linear restrictions on the coefficient
matrix Γ. The intuition behind orthogonality is effectively provided by Bernanke (1986)
who describes structural innovations as exogenous signals impacting the system and
causing shocks. As these shocks do not have common causes, they can be treated
as if they were uncorrelated9. In the classical dynamic simultaneous equation setup,
structural innovations play a conceptually different role: they represent error terms thus
lack of any economic interpretation. For this reason Σε is typically left unrestricted when
identification is aimed at estimating static/dynamic multipliers.
The second stage in the SVAR identification strategy is normalization since IRFs are
usually aimed as showing responses of yt to one standard deviation shock in the
structural innovations, σε,ii are set equal to one. Therefore, the structural innovations’
variance-covariance matrix becomes a K-dimensional identity matrix which poses further
restrictions on Γ. When Σε = IK then Σe = Γ
−1ΣεΓ−1
′
= Γ−1Γ−1
′
; we can think of
Σe = Γ
−1Γ−1
′
as a system of nonlinear equations in the unknown parameters of Γ−1. Since
Σe has K(K + 1)/2 elements estimated along with reduced form parameters in model
(D.2) and Γ−1 has K2 elements, we need K2 − K(K + 1)/2 = K(K − 1)/2 additional
restrictions on Γ−1 to achieve identification.
Given the idea that reduced form innovations are linear functions of contemporaneous
structural form innovations though et = Γ
−1εt, one can choose to set the remaining
K(K − 1)/2 restrictions to relate εt and et in a convenient and theoretically grounded
way. In other words, when exclusion restrictions on the structural parameters are imposed,
9Naturally, this assumption is far from being without critiques, see Gottschalk (2001) for a synthetic
discussion.
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one should figure out which structural shocks could affect the variable of interest at time
t. For example, in the 2 × 2 case one needs 2(2 − 1)/2 = 1 exclusion restriction on Γ−1
to achieve identification; if the structural parameter γ12 ∈ Γ−1 is set equal to zero, then
we implicitly assume that y1 does not react to a standard deviation innovation in y2 at
time t. This is easily verified by writing model (D.4) in full matrix notation:y1t
y2t
 =
Φ(0)11 Φ(0)12
Φ(0)21 Φ(0)22
γ11 0
γ21 γ22
ε1t
ε2t
+
Φ(1)11 Φ(1)12
Φ(1)21 Φ(1)22
γ11 0
γ21 γ22

ε1t−1
ε2t−1
Φ(2)11 Φ(2)12
Φ(2)21 Φ(2)22
γ11 0
γ21 γ22
ε1t−2
ε2t−2
+ . . .
which is equivalent to
y1t = (Φ(0)11γ11 + Φ(0)12γ21) ε1t + Φ(0)12γ22ε2t + (Φ(1)11γ11 + Φ(1)12γ21) ε1t−1
+ Φ(1)12γ22ε2t−1 + (Φ(2)11γ11 + Φ(2)12γ21) ε1t−2 + Φ(2)12γ22ε2t−2 + . . .
= (Φ(0)∗11 + Φ(0)
∗
12) ε1t + Φ(0)
∗
12ε2t + (Φ(1)
∗
11 + Φ(1)
∗
12) ε1t−1 + Φ(1)
∗
12ε2t−1
+ (Φ(2)∗11 + Φ(2)
∗
12) ε1t−2 + Φ(2)
∗
12ε2t−2 + . . .
y2t = (Φ(0)21γ11 + Φ(0)22γ21) ε1t + Φ(0)12γ22ε2t + (Φ(1)21γ11 + Φ(1)22γ21) ε1t−1
+ Φ(1)22γ22ε2t−1 + (Φ(2)21γ11 + Φ(2)22γ21) ε1t−2 + Φ(2)22γ22ε2t−2 + . . .
= (Φ(0)∗21 + Φ(0)
∗
22) ε1t + Φ(0)
∗
22ε2t + (Φ(1)
∗
21 + Φ(1)
∗
22) ε1t−1 + Φ(1)
∗
22ε2t−1
+ (Φ(2)∗21 + Φ(2)
∗
22) ε1t−2 + Φ(2)
∗
22ε2t−2 + . . .
Note that
Γ =
 1 0
γ∗21 1
 and Γ−1 =
γ11 0
γ21 γ22

are practically identical although the elements on the main diagonal differ because of
a alternative normalization strategies. In fact, there exist other approaches to system
identification; one consists of leaving the diagonal elements of Σε unrestricted (i.e. Σε 6=
IK) and set the diagonal elements of Γ to unity in εt = Γet. A very useful result in this
context is that when Γ is lower triangular, Γ−1 is lower triangular as well; however, since
the variance of the structural errors is no longer one, the estimated Γ−1 (recall that we can
134
only estimate Γ−1 through Σe = Γ−1Γ−1
′
) must be re-scaled by one (residual) standard
deviation to make sure that the structural IRFs represent responses to one-standard
deviation shocks in εt.
To sum up, exclusion restrictions on Γ or Γ−1 are imposed in order to trace out the
dynamic responses of the model to structural innovations. Gottschalk (2001) refers to
this way of interpreting restrictions as ”shock view” of SVAR models: given equation (D.1)
and Σε = IK , the author shows that subtracting E [yt|It−1] to both sides of model (D.1),
where It−1 is the information available at time t− 1, yields to the relationship εt = Γet.
In this case, the SVAR presented in equation (D.1) only models the unexpected changes
in yt.
SVAR modelling under non-stationarity and cointegration
Assume that the vector yt consists of K non-cointegrated I(1) processes. In this case
∆yt = (∆y1t, . . . ,∆yKt) is I(0) and equation (D.1) has the form
Γ∆yt = A(L)yt + εt (D.5)
with εt ∼ WN (0, IK). Similarly, when yt is a mixture of j non-cointegrated I(1)
processes and K − j I(0) series, ∆yt contains both variables in first differences and
variables in levels, namely: ∆yt = (∆y1t, . . . ,∆yK−jt, yK−j+1t, . . . , yKt) (see Blanchard
and Quah (1988)). It follows that the reduced form of (D.5) becomes
∆yt = Γ
−1A(L)∆yt + Γ
−1εt
= A∗(L)∆yt + et
Therefore, identification and structural IRFs estimation are tackled as in ordinary SVAR
modelling.
Suppose now that the vector yt consists of K cointegrated I(1) processes such
that yt ∼ CI (1, b) and the linear combination zt = βyt is I(1 − b) (in most cases
yt ∼ CI(1, 1)). Following Engle and Granger (1987) if yt ∼ CI (1, b), then there must
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exist a vector error correction model (VECM) representation of the dynamic system
governing the joint behaviour of each yit ∈ yt; the VECM has the following form:
∆yt = αβ
′yt−1 + Θ1∆yt−1 + Θ2∆yt−2 + . . .+ Θp−1∆yt−p+1 + et (D.6)
Even through equation (D.6) does not include any assumption from theory, it can be
however interpreted as the reduced form of a structural VEC model (SVEC). A general
specification of a SVEC without deterministic trends and exogenous variables can be
represented by the following expression:
Γ∆yt = Π
∗yt−1 + Θ
∗
1∆yt−1 + Θ
∗
2∆yt−2 + . . .+ Θ
∗
p−1∆yt−p+1 + εt (D.7)
where Π∗ = Γαβ′, Θ∗t = ΓΘt and εt = Γet. It follows that the interpretation of the
parameters in Γ does not change when non-stationarity is included in SVAR models;
therefore, in order to identify structural from parameters, non-sample restrictions shall
again be imposed to Γ. Obviously, parameters’ matrices in the reduced form equation
(D.6) are defined as αβ′ = Γ−1Π∗, Θt = Γ−1Θ∗t . The vector process in (D.7) has also
an MA representation named after Beveridge and Nelson (1981)
yt = Ξ
T∑
i=1
ei +
∞∑
j=0
Ξ∗et−j + y∗0 (D.8)
where Ξ
∑T
i=1 ei is an I(1) process reflecting the long-run effects of the reduced form
innovation on yt (common trend term), while
∑∞
j=0 Ξ
∗et−j is an I(0) process representing
the short-run effects (transitory effects) of reduced form innovations because they fade
out as j → ∞. Note that Ξ∗ need to be absolutely summable for the infinite sum to be
defined (
∑∞
j=0 Ξ
∗et−j → 0 as j → ∞). The matrix Ξ has rank K − r, where r is the
amount of transitory effects and K − r is the number of common trends; r is typically
determined through the popular testing procedures proposed by Johansen (1995).
Identification of SVEC models is slightly different from what is typically applied in a
SVAR framework (Lu¨tkepohl, 2006); however, the focus is once again on the relationship
between reduced form and structural innovations εt = Γet or
Γ−1εt = et. (D.9)
136
Plugging (D.9) into (D.8) leads to the structural counterpart of the Beveridge and Nelson
(1981) representation
yt = Λ
T∑
i=1
εi +
∞∑
j=0
Λ∗εt−j + y∗0 (D.10)
where Λ = ΞΓ−1 and Λ∗ = Ξ∗Γ−1 10. Therefore, the long-run effects of structural
innovations are given by Λ. The number of transitory effects (r) translates into r
columns of Λ being set to zero; this implies that r structural innovation do not play
any contemporaneous effect on yt in the long run (i.e. r structural innovations only
have transitory effects), while r(K − r) must have long-run (permanent) effects. Overall,
just-identification still requires K(K − 1)/2 parameter restrictions. It is reasoned from
the Beveridge and Nelson (1981) representation that if r(K − r) shocks exert permanent
effects and only r are transitory, then r(K−r) restrictions can be imposed according to the
cointegration structure of the model. Therefore, [K(K − 1)/2]− [r(K − r)] = C further
parameters shall be properly excluded to identify structural parameters and estimate
structural IRFs. In fact, r(r − 1)/2 restrictions out of C must be placed on Γ−1 to
disentangle transitory innovation shocks, while the remaining r(K − r) [r(K − r)− 1] /2
serve to identify permanent shocks and shall be introduced in Λ (King et al., 1987;
Gonzalo and Ng, 2001; Lu¨tkepohl, 2006).
Variance decomposition
Consider the Wold representation of an identified SVAR model
yt = Φ
∗(L)εt
The variance of the ith entry of the random vector yt is given by the following expression
var(yit) =
K∑
k=1
∞∑
h=0
Φ∗ik(h)
2var(εkt)
=
K∑
k=1
∞∑
h=0
Φ∗ik(h)
2
10note that specification (D.10) is analogous to (D.4) with the exception of Λ
∑T
i=1 εi; whereas in
(D.4) we only care about shot-run contemporaneous relationships, when we have yt ∼ C(1, b) we also
need the account for a long-run component.
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because var(εkt) = 1. Obviously,
∑∞
h=0 Φ
∗
ik(h)
2 represents the variance of yit generated by
the kth shock; therefore, the share of variance of yit attributable to the k
th shock is given
by the ratio ∑∞
h=0 Φ
∗
ik(h)
2∑K
k=1
∑∞
h=0 Φ
∗
ik(h)
2
(D.11)
Consider now the forecast error at time t
yt − E [yt|It−1]
This expression indicates the change in each variable inside yt that could not have been
forecast between t − 1 and t; this inaccuracy is due to the realization of the structural
shocks in the system presented in equation (D.1). More generally, we can compute the
forecast error over many different horizons, h; therefore, the previous definition can be
re-written as
yt+h − E
[
yt+h|It+h−1
]
Since the mean forecast error is equal to zero, for h = 1 and yy = (y1t, y2t) we have that
y1t+1 − E [y1t+1|It] = Φ∗11(0)ε1t+1 + Φ∗11(1)ε1t + Φ∗12(0)ε2t+1 + Φ∗12(1)ε2t
and its variance is simply
var (y1t+1 − E [y1t+1|It]) = Φ∗11(0)2 + Φ∗11(1)2 + Φ∗12(0)2 + Φ∗12(1)2
For an arbitrary h, we can define the forecast error variance for the ith component of the
(K × 1) random vector yt recursively as
Ωi(0) = Φ
∗
i1(0)
2 + . . .+ Φ∗iK(0)
Ωi(1) = Φ
∗
i1(1)
2 + . . .+ Φ∗iK(1) + Ωi(0)
...
Ωi(h) = Φ
∗
i1(h)
2 + . . .+ Φ∗iK(h) + Ωi(h− 1)
...
Ωi(H) = Φ
∗
i1(H)
2 + . . .+ Φ∗iK(H)
2 + Ωi(H − 1) =
K∑
k=1
H∑
h=0
Φ∗ik(h)
2
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with i, k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Therefore, in order to quantify the importance of each shock in
explaining the variation in each variable in the system, we can use the same expression
as in equation (D.11) namely:
ωik(H) =
∑H
h=0 Φ
∗
ik(h)
2
Ωi(H)
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